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INTRODUCTION
When the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) took effect
in May 2018, it positioned the European Union as the world’s privacy
champion.1 A flurry of emails updating privacy policies landed in inboxes across the globe, attesting to the international reach of the European rule.2 A month later, California enacted the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), establishing the nation’s most stringent
omnibus privacy protections, effective as of January 1, 2020.3 California, the home of many of the world’s largest data-based enterprises,4
emerged as a dark horse contender in the privacy regulator race. In
the past year, state after state considered broad data privacy legislation,5 and eleven comprehensive federal privacy bills were introduced
in Congress.6
1. Adam Satariano, G.D.P.R., a New Privacy Law, Makes Europe World’s Leading
Tech Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/
technology/europe-gdpr-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/24RK-ZMJV].
2. Brian Fung, Why You’re Getting Flooded with Privacy Notifications in Your
Email, WASH. POST (May 25, 2018, 3:15 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-switch/wp/2018/05/25/why-youre-getting-flooded-with-privacy-notifications
-in-your-email [https://perma.cc/MGR2-XYGW].
3. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–.199 (2018); Daisuke Wakabayashi, Silicon
Valley Faces Regulatory Fight on Its Home Turf, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/05/13/business/california-data-privacy-ballot-measure
.html [https://perma.cc/7XTE-3LU3].
4. Hank Tucker, World’s Largest Technology Companies 2020: Apple Stays on Top,
Zoom and Uber Debut, FORBES (May 13, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/hanktucker/2020/05/13/worlds-largest-technology-companies-2020-apple
-stays-on-top-zoom-and-uber-debut [https://perma.cc/L473-BYT3].
5. See infra Part III.B.1.
6. See Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 2968, 116th Cong. (2019) (Sen.
Maria Cantwell); Online Privacy Act of 2019, H.R. 4978, 116th Cong. (2019) (Rep. Anna
Eshoo); Designing Accounting Safeguards To Help Broaden Oversight and Regulations
on Data Act, S. 1951, 116th Cong. (2019) (Sen. Mark Warner); Do Not Track Act, S.
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What is catalyzing U.S. privacy law? The conventional wisdom
holds that Europe is setting the global standard for information privacy. There is much truth to this—some 142 countries and counting
now have a broad data privacy law, typically modeled on the GDPR.7
Scholars writing insightfully about the global race to information privacy have tracked the spread of data privacy laws across the world,
noting Europe’s influence on these developments.8 In a recent article,
Paul Schwartz observes that the European Union pioneered international privacy law to enable commerce among nations within the bloc
itself.9 He argues that other countries largely adopted the European
1578, 116th Cong. (2019) (Sen. Josh Hawley); Privacy Bill of Rights Act, S. 1214, 116th
Cong. (2019) (Sen. Edward Markey); Balancing the Rights of Web Surfers Equally and
Responsibly (BROWSER) Act of 2019, S. 1116, 116th Cong. (2019) (Sen. Marsha Blackburn); Information Transparency & Personal Data Control Act, H.R. 2013, 116th Cong.
(2019) (Rep. Suzan DelBene); Own Your Own Data Act, S.806, 116th Cong. (2019) (Sen.
John Kennedy); Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 1282, 116th Cong. (2019) (Rep.
Bobby Rush); Social Media Privacy Protection and Consumer Rights Act of 2019, S. 189,
116th Cong. (2019) (Sen. Amy Klobuchar); American Data Dissemination (ADD) Act of
2019, S. 142, 116th Cong. (2019) (Sen. Marco Rubio); see also Data Care Act of 2018, S.
3744, 115th Cong. (2018) (Sen. Brian Schatz); Mind Your Own Business Act of 2019, S.
2637, 116th Cong. (2019) (Sen. Ron Wyden) (updating Sen. Wyden’s 2018 Consumer
Data Protection Act); Customer Online Notification for Stopping Edge-provider Network Transgressions (CONSENT) Act, S. 2639, 115th Cong. (2018) (Sen. Markey). In
June 2020, Senator Sherrod Brown released the “Data Accountability and Transparency Act of 2020” as a discussion draft. Data Accountability and Transparency Act,
SIL20719, 116th Cong (2020).
7. The exact number of countries with comprehensive data protection laws depends on one’s characterization of any particular law and keeps changing as more
countries adopt new laws. While Graham Greenleaf identifies 142 countries and jurisdictions with such laws, Graham Greenleaf & Bertil Cottier, 2020 Ends a Decade of 62
New Data Privacy Laws, in 163 PRIV. L. & BUS. INT’L REP. 24, 24–25 (2020), the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) counts 128. Data Protection
and Privacy Legislation Worldwide, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., https://unctad.org/
page/data-protection-and-privacy-legislation-worldwide [https://perma.cc/W47P
-RHL2]. Most recent laws are modeled on the GDPR. See, e.g., Nigeria Data Protection
Regulation (2019), https://nitda.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/
NigeriaDataProtectionRegulation11.pdf. Among other differences, the Nigerian law
permits fines up to two percent of global turnover, not the four percent permitted by
the GDPR. Compare id. § 2.10(a), with General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679,
art. 83(5), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 83 [hereinafter GDPR].
8. See, e.g., Graham Greenleaf, Global Convergence of Data Privacy Standards and
Laws: Speaking Notes for the European Commission Events on the Launch of the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in Brussels and New Delhi, 25 May 2018 (U.N.S.W. L.
Rsch. Series, Paper No. 18-56, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3184548.
9. Paul M. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 771, 810
(2019) (“[The EU’s] power in this regard first developed in response to issues that it
faced internally. It needed to harmonize the data processing practices of EU member
states. The inward-facing elements of EU data protection law then became an important factor in its adaptability to the rest of the world. Here is a global diffusion story

1736

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:1733

Union’s data privacy model, reflecting its “success in the marketplace
of ideas.”10
Schwartz cites the CCPA as an example of Europe’s success in
spurring other jurisdictions to enact similar laws.11 Journalists reporting on the CCPA’s enactment, too, have frequently referred to it as
“GDPR lite”12 and “California’s version of GDPR.”13 And as the push for
federal legislation intensifies, many characterize it as a national response to the GDPR.14
This Article challenges this emerging consensus. Despite decades
of European privacy law, the United States showed little appetite until
now for broad privacy legislation.15 Instead, norm entrepreneurs in
California helped establish a new privacy framework that, as we show,
differs significantly—and consciously—from the European model.16
Our close comparison of the new California and European laws reveals
that the CCPA is not simply GDPR-lite: it is both more and less demanding on various points.17 It offers a fundamentally different regime for data privacy. And the numerous legislative proposals in state
that begins with a response to internal political considerations.”); see also Michael D.
Birnhack, The EU Data Protection Directive: An Engine of a Global Regime, 24 COMPUT.
L. & SEC. REP. 508, 510 (2008).
10. Schwartz, supra note 9, at 818.
11. Id. at 816 (“Ideas matter. Even though the adequacy requirement provides an
impressive fulcrum for international influence, the global success of EU data protection
is also attributable to the sheer appeal of high standards for data protection. This appeal cannot alone be explained by the force of EU market power or even specific EU
negotiating strategies. To illustrate, this Article can point to an example from the
United States, namely, the enactment of the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) of
2018.”). Global legal convergence can indeed be the result of normative agreement.
See, e.g., Anupam Chander & Randall Costa, Clearing Credit Default Swaps: A Case Study
in Global Legal Convergence, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 639, 640 (2010) (arguing that in the wake
of the 2008/2009 financial crisis, the United States and Europe “converged on a similar
clearing structure largely because of its compelling logic”).
12. See, e.g., Kayvan Alikhani, Regulatory Disruption: Is Your Business Ready To
Comply with the CCPA?, FORBES (June 6, 2019, 9:15 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/06/06/regulatory-disruption-is-your-business-ready
-to-comply-with-the-ccpa [https://perma.cc/Y56A-BDRE].
13. See, e.g., George P. Slefo, Marketers and Tech Companies Confront California’s
Version of GDPR, ADAGE (June 29, 2018), https://adage.com/article/digital/california
-passed-version-gdpr/314079 [https://perma.cc/U7M7-7BKN].
14. See, e.g., Elizabeth Schulze, The US Wants To Copy Europe’s Strict Data Privacy
Law—but Only Some of It, CNBC (May 23, 2019, 1:16 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2019/05/23/gdpr-one-year-on-ceos-politicians-push-for-us-federal-privacy-law
.html [https://perma.cc/3KEP-JXBQ].
15. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part II (comparing the GDPR and the CCPA).
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houses show greater fealty to California’s model than to the European
antecedent.18 Bills pending before Congress reflect pressure not from
Brussels, but from Sacramento.
Thus, California has emerged as a kind of privacy superregulator,
catalyzing privacy law in the United States. Rather than the supranational EU, the subnational state of California—and, more specifically,
a small network of determined individuals within that state—is now
driving privacy in a significant part of the world. The emergence of the
CCPA demonstrates the central role of local networks and norm entrepreneurship, contesting on the ground of what we call “data globalization.”19
We are thus witnessing a paradigm shift in the policy conversation around data privacy law. Until now, the rules of transatlantic privacy rested on awkward negotiated mechanisms to transfer data between two seemingly irreconcilable regimes.20 Now we are witnessing
what might be characterized as a regulatory race on both sides of the
ocean.21
This Article is the first to critically evaluate the relationship between California’s privacy law, Europe’s data protection regulation,
and possible future state and federal privacy law.22 This study is also
of practical interest, answering questions for individuals and
18. See sources cited supra note 6.
19. See discussion infra Part III.C (explaining how data globalization helped propel the CCPA to its current status).
20. See Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (establishing pre-GDPR rules
regulating the processing and movement of personal data); PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL
R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A STUDY OF UNITED STATES DATA PROTECTION 1–2
(1996) (comparing European countries’ comprehensive data protection laws to other
countries’ less thorough laws). But see Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan,
Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 281–82 (2011) (arguing
that the regimes are more similar than different in practice); see also William
McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 1025 (2016)
(demonstrating similarities in enforcement between different data privacy regimes
despite differences in the law on the books).
21. See, e.g., Sara Merken, States Follow EU, California in Push for Consumer Privacy Laws (1), BLOOMBERG L., https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data
-security/states-follow-eu-california-in-push-for-consumer-privacy-laws-1 (Feb. 6,
2019, 3:02 PM).
22. The focus of our study is on regulation of the data protection practices of private parties, rather than on the protection of privacy against intrusions by the state—
on the regulation of “surveillance capitalism” rather than on more traditional state surveillance. See Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of
an Information Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75, 75 (2015) (defining “surveillance capitalism” as a “new form of information capitalism [that] aims to predict and modify human behavior as a means to produce revenue and market control”).
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businesses alike: For businesses, whose laws should I follow? For individuals, who will protect my privacy? Studying these questions
leads, in turn, to another set of inquiries about the ways in which catalysis from the GDPR and CCPA govern privacy outside either Europe
or California. When Europe’s laws meet California’s, who wins? If indeed European or Californian regulation will be applied globally de
facto, why then should anyone else legislate?
The answers to all of these questions have implications not only
for the shape of information privacy law but for understanding interjurisdictional regulatory dynamics in the digital economy. While data
shares some characteristics with cars, pollution, and corporate charters—all the subject of prior globalizations of legal compliance and legal rules23—it also differs because of its simultaneous and instantaneous global effects. Data disobeys borders and operates at Internet
speed. Equally important, the answers to these questions shed light
on the prospects of countries across the world as they vie for advantage in the information age. Ultimately, our account of privacy catalysis tests the operation of both federalism and international regulatory competition in the twenty-first century.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Part I situates our discussion of
regulatory catalysis in data privacy within the broader frame of the
theory of regulatory competition, borrowing lessons from areas such
as corporate and environmental law. Part II compares the substance
of the GDPR and the CCPA and the ways in which their structures promote catalysis in other jurisdictions. Part III turns to the race for data
privacy law. We are the first to disentangle the catalytic effects on U.S.
federal and state laws coming from both Brussels and Sacramento and
to show that the resulting proposals are distinctly American and owe
a greater debt to the CCPA than to the GDPR. As it once did with pioneering environmental regulation, California has emerged as a superregulator again, this time with respect to data in the information age.
I. SUPERREGULATORS
U.S. privacy law can be periodized as pre-CCPA and post-CCPA.
Until the CCPA, no state or federal statute in the United States imposed
privacy protections across all industry sectors and technologies in the
manner that European data protection law had done for decades. Ever
since the CCPA, Congress and state legislatures across the country

23. See generally, e.g., Robert V. Percival, The Globalization of Environmental Law,
26 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 451 (2009).
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have been considering huge numbers of data privacy proposals of that
scope.24
What is prompting this new interest in comprehensive data privacy law in the United States? Many point to the EU’s GDPR. After all,
the GDPR went into effect in May 2018 to much fanfare. Countries
around the world changed their laws to conform more closely with the
GDPR, drawn by hopes of achieving a finding of “adequacy,” which
would facilitate their data trade with European economies.25 The
GDPR also prompted global companies to establish expensive compliance programs and infrastructure.26 It makes sense, at first glance, to
think that Europe has, through the GDPR, driven U.S. states and the
federal government to take privacy seriously at last. If so, this development would fit neatly with the larger phenomenon that is sometimes called the “Brussels Effect.”27
But if this is the case, why did it take so long? Anu Bradford coined
the phrase back in 2012,28 and the EU promulgated its original data
protection directive in 1995.29 If European law prompted soul-searching among American lawmakers, its voyage across the Atlantic proved
quite slow.
This Part summarizes overlapping theories of regulatory competition and catalysis, drawn from varied subject matter areas, including
corporate and environmental law. In all of these domains, early claims
of a race to the bottom spurred by globalization have been challenged
by scholars who suggested alternative regulatory dynamics that might
lead to a race to the top or a race to the optimum.30 Often these effects
are named for the places where they were first detected: Delaware,

24. See supra note 6 (listing recent data privacy bills considered by Congress).
25. Schwartz, supra note 9, at 783–86.
26. See Mehreen Khan, Companies Face High Cost To Meet New EU Data Protection
Rules, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/0d47ffe4-ccb6-11e7
-b781-794ce08b24dc.
27. Mark Scott & Laurens Cerulus, Europe’s New Data Protection Rules Export Privacy Standards Worldwide, POLITICO (Jan. 31, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.politico
.eu/article/europe-data-protection-privacy-standards-gdpr-general-protection-data
-regulation [https://perma.cc/2RWQ-X4WB].
28. Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 23 (2012) (describing
spread of EU-style privacy protections in the wake of the EU’s 1995 Data Protection
Directive).
29. Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31.
30. See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory
of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254 (1977) (“[C]ompetitive legal systems
should tend toward optimality so far as the shareholders’ relationship to the corporation is concerned.”).
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California, or Brussels.31 In different ways, these three jurisdictions
have emerged as “superregulators.” Later in the Article we will consider which of these superregulator effects have catalyzed data privacy rules across the United States.
A. THE DELAWARE EFFECT
Regulatory competition has been investigated in the greatest
depth in corporate law.32 An early view argued that corporations
would charter themselves in the most permissive state, leading U.S.
states to compete with each other to offer ever more lax corporate
law.33 Some dubbed this the “Delaware Effect,”34 because two-thirds
of all Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in that state.35
A critical legal rule made regulatory competition possible. State
laws defer to a corporation’s decision on its state of incorporation—
known as the “internal affairs” doctrine.36 Thus, a corporation operating principally in California or Kansas can incorporate in Delaware
and be assured that relations between its shareholders, directors, and
officers will be governed by Delaware law.37 Without this “internal affairs” rule, a corporation might have to conform to the corporate law
31. See infra Parts I.A–C.
32. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
33. Justice Louis Brandeis explained the liberalization of corporate law through
this dynamic:
Lesser States, eager for the revenue derived from the traffic in charters, had
removed safeguards from their own incorporation laws. Companies were
early formed to provide charters for corporations in states where the cost
was lowest and the laws least restrictive. . . . The race was one not of diligence
but of laxity.
Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557–59 (1933) (citations omitted).
34. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 28, at 5.
35. See DEL. DIV. OF CORPS., ANNUAL REPORT STATISTICS (2018), https://corpfiles
.delaware.gov/Annual-Reports/Division-of-Corporations-2018-Annual-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8BRQ-QFLX]. And this does not apply only to large, established corporations: in 2017, over eighty percent of initial public offerings in the United States
used Delaware as a corporate home. Id.
36. Rogers v. Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y., 288 U.S. 123, 130 (1933) (“It has long been settled doctrine that a court—state or federal—sitting in one State will as a general rule
decline to interfere with or control by injunction or otherwise the management of the
internal affairs of a corporation organized under the laws of another State but will
leave controversies as to such matters to the courts of the State of the domicile.”); VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1112 (Del. 2005)
(“The internal affairs doctrine is a long-standing choice of law principle which recognizes that only one state should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal
affairs—the state of incorporation.”).
37. See VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996, 871 A.2d at 1112.
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of all of the jurisdictions in which it operates. The internal affairs doctrine thus allows a company to establish a single regulator for the corporate law affairs of the corporation.38
The classic analyses posited that Delaware had cornered the market for incorporations through dubious efforts to favor corporate officers and directors.39 Ralph Winter famously rejected this claim of an
inevitable race to the bottom, arguing that corporate leaders were not
in fact free to choose the most permissive jurisdiction because shareholders would penalize them for failing to maximize shareholder
value.40 Where some had derided Delaware’s efforts as “law for
sale,”41 Roberta Romano argued that Delaware’s efforts were part of
the genius of American law.42 Instead of seeking to race to the bottom
to attract corporate charters, Delaware courts, for their part, saw their
role as providing special corporate law expertise.43 Regulatory
38. With respect to corporate law, the European Union did not embrace a similar
approach to that in the United States until recently. Rather than deferring to the state
of incorporation, many EU states sought to establish where the “real seat” of the corporation lay. Werner F. Ebke, The Real Seat Doctrine in the Conflict of Corporate Laws,
36 INT’L L. 1015, 1015–16 (2002). Such an approach would not defer to the mailbox
incorporation available in Delaware. See id. This rule would still typically result in a
single regulator—but this would make gaming the law more difficult. Matthew G. Dore,
Déjà Vu All Over Again? The Internal Affairs Rule and Entity Law Convergence Patterns
in Europe and the United States, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 317, 317–18 (2014). One
would actually have to locate one’s headquarters (the management and control center)
in the jurisdiction with the friendliest laws, rather than simply fill out some forms to
incorporate via a mailbox. Recent EU caselaw has, however, moved towards the U.S.
internal affairs rule, deferring to the jurisdiction of the state of incorporation. Id. at
325–29. This opens up the possibility of regulatory competition for corporate law in
Europe as well.
39. Cary, supra note 32, at 672. According to this view, states such as Delaware
might wish to attract incorporations because of the franchise tax—the annual fees corporations pay to maintain their incorporation in that state. Indeed, Delaware has come
to fund one-quarter of its budget through this means. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 24 (2012) (“Delaware generates
$740–800 million per year in franchise taxes, which amounts to a quarter of the state’s
budget.”); DEL. OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FINANCIAL OVERVIEW (2018), https://budget
.delaware.gov/budget/fy2018/documents/operating/financial-overview.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R7KY-9YK6] (estimating franchise taxes of “$975.0 million for Fiscal Year 2017 and $992.6 million for Fiscal Year 2018”).
40. Winter, supra note 30, at 257 (“If management is to secure initial capital . . . it
must attract investors away from the almost infinite variety of competing opportunities.”).
41. E.g., Editors, Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law
of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861 (1969).
42. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 37–39 (1993).
43. As one Delaware Chancery Court judge noted, “Delaware has a substantial interest in providing an effective forum for litigating disputes involving the internal
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competition, seen from this perspective, can occur not just through
the content of the governing rules but also through the quality of their
adjudication.
The Delaware Effect therefore can be summarized as the emergence of certain jurisdictions as highly influential overseers of particular behavior based on proactive elections made by regulated entities—an opt-in to a particular jurisdiction. If enough regulated entities
make the same choice, that jurisdiction may come to dominate the
field. Both the substantive law and the regulatory techniques of a jurisdiction may then gain influence outside its borders as other regulators defer to it.44 While this arrangement could result in a race to the
bottom, it could also enable the emergence of highly specialized expert regulatory oversight that then becomes the standard to which
other jurisdictions defer.
B. THE CALIFORNIA EFFECT
David Vogel famously challenged a similar hypothesis of a race to
the bottom in environmental regulation and consumer protection law.
Where many argued that international trade would inevitably lead to
the erosion of consumer and environmental regulation, Vogel countered that “under certain circumstances, global economic integration
can actually lead to the strengthening of consumer and environmental
standards.”45 Instead of a race to the bottom (what he, adopting the
traditional view, called a “Delaware Effect”) he offered that regulatory
competition might result in a “California Effect.”46 This outcome
hinged on “the critical role of powerful and wealthy ‘green’ political

affairs of Delaware corporations.” In re Activision Blizzard, Inc., 86 A.3d 531, 547 (Del.
Ch. 2014). For support for this statement, Vice Chancellor Laster cited Roberta Romano’s book The Genius of American Corporate Law: “‘The most important transactionspecific asset in the chartering relation is an intangible asset, Delaware’s reputation
for responsiveness to corporate concerns,’ which stems from ‘a comprehensive body
of case law, judicial expertise in corporation law, and administrative expertise in the
rapid processing of corporate filings.’” Id. at 547 n.7 (citing ROMANO, supra note 42, at
38–39).
44. See, e.g., Dore, supra note 38, at 325–29 (describing the EU’s shift toward the
internal affairs rule).
45. David Vogel & Robert A. Kagan, Introduction: National Regulations in a Global
Economy, in DYNAMICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE 1, 1 (David Vogel & Robert A. Kagan eds.,
2004); DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY 5 (2004) (“To the extent that trade liberalization has affected the level of consumer and environmental protection, it has more often strengthened than weakened
it.”).
46. VOGEL, supra note 45, at 5–8.
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jurisdictions in promoting a regulatory ‘race to the top’ among their
trading partners.”47
Unlike the Delaware Effect, in which a jurisdiction tempts companies to opt into its regulatory scheme and other jurisdictions then defer to that one’s expertise, the California Effect occurs when one jurisdiction pushes other jurisdictions to improve their own laws.48 This
race to the top is de jure in nature, rather than de facto or deferential;
other jurisdictions pass laws that mimic the superregulator jurisdiction.
Vogel identified three conditions under which a California Effect
might occur.49 First, a race to the top is more likely to be triggered if
the standards are supported by a coalition of public interest groups
with regulated companies that wish to impose the regulatory costs
they face on their competitors in other, more lax jurisdictions.50 Second, the superregulator must have a large market that is sufficiently
attractive that companies would rather absorb the cost of regulation
than forego the market.51 Third, a race to the top is more likely to occur if there is a strong institution capable of harmonizing standards
across jurisdictions, such as the U.S. federal government or the EU.52
The classic example of the California Effect is California’s emissions regulations for automobiles. As Ann Carlson explains, from the
mid-1960s onward, the state pioneered strong tailpipe emissions
standards.53 When Congress amended the Clean Air Act to preempt
state standards for emissions, it grandfathered in “any state” that had
emissions controls in place prior to March 30, 1966—a standard applicable only to California, as lawmakers understood perfectly well.54
The Clean Air Act of 1970 explicitly recognized California as a superregulator: it became the only state allowed to set stricter-than-federal
standards, and other states could then opt to follow California’s standards.55 Twelve eastern states and the District of Columbia announced
47. Id. at 6.
48. See id. at 5–8.
49. Id. at 260–68; see also Sebastiaan Princen, Trading Up in the Transatlantic Relationship, 24 J. PUB. POL’Y 127, 128 (2004) (discussing Vogel’s proposed conditions).
50. VOGEL, supra note 45, at 260–61.
51. Id. at 261–63.
52. Id. at 263–68.
53. Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
1097, 1111 (2009).
54. Id.
55. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1078–79 (9th
Cir. 2013) (“Other states could choose to follow either the federal or the California
standards, but they could not adopt standards of their own.”); Carlson, supra note 53,
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in 1994 that they would follow California.56 Auto emissions rules illustrate all three of Vogel’s conditions: a coalition of public interest
groups alongside regulated companies, a superregulator with a large
and attractive market, and a strong institution (the federal government) capable of harmonizing standards.
The mechanism of the California Effect differs from the Delaware
Effect. Under the Delaware Effect, other jurisdictions defer to the regulatory choices of the superregulator, magnifying the impact of those
choices.57 Under the California Effect, other jurisdictions themselves
adopt the same rules as the superregulator jurisdiction.58
C. THE BRUSSELS EFFECT
In the late twentieth century, as the authority and institutions of
the European Union grew, another superregulator emerged: Brussels,
the seat of the EU bureaucracy. As Anu Bradford vividly describes it:
“Few Americans are aware that EU regulations determine the makeup
they apply in the morning, the cereal they eat for breakfast, the software they use on their computer, and the privacy settings they adjust
on their Facebook page. And that’s just before 8:30 AM.”59
Where the California Effect depends on jurisdictions racing to
strengthen their regulations in response to each other, the Brussels
Effect operates principally as a de facto mechanism, when market actors conform their global products to European rules.60 Bradford observes, “[T]he Brussels Effect is more about one jurisdiction’s ability
to override others than it is about triggering an upward race.”61

at 1134 (noting California’s special status); Nicholas Bryner & Meredith Hankins, Why
California Gets To Write Its Own Auto Emissions Standards: 5 Questions Answered,
CONVERSATION, https://theconversation.com/why-california-gets-to-write-its-own
-auto-emissions-standards-5-questions-answered-94379 [https://perma.cc/H7U4
-CLJQ]. In 2019, the EPA and NHTSA formally withdrew California’s Clean Air Act
waiver. Coral Davenport, Trump To Revoke California’s Authority To Set Stricter Auto
Emissions Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/17/
climate/trump-california-emissions-waiver.html [https://perma.cc/QCL6-TDZ6].
56. Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining
Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 67, 82 (1996).
57. See supra Part I.A.
58. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text.
59. Bradford, supra note 28, at 3 (citations omitted).
60. See id. (“Unilateral regulatory globalization occurs when a single state is able
to externalize its laws and regulations outside its borders through market mechanisms, resulting in the globalization of standards.”).
61. Id. at 8.
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Why might a corporation change its practices outside Europe,
adopting stricter codes absent legal compulsion? Bradford explains,
“[M]ultinational corporations often have an incentive to standardize
their production globally and adhere to a single rule.”62 Of course,
sometimes these enterprises do decide to observe different regulatory
regimes in different locations. Just as Vogel distilled the conditions for
a California Effect, Bradford identifies circumstances under which a
Brussels Effect is more likely to occur.63 First, as with the California
Effect, the Brussels Effect is likely to occur only when the unilateral
regulator represents a large and attractive market.64 Second, that superregulator must have significant regulatory capacity, through which
it tends to aim strict rules at “inelastic targets” such as consumer markets, thus creating rules that can’t be readily evaded.65 Third, the operations of the firm must be “nondivisible,” meaning that it is less
costly for a firm to comply with the one higher standard worldwide
than to set up different compliance standards.66
Unlike the effects named for Delaware and California, the Brussels Effect depends on the choices of the entities subject to regulations, not those of governments or regulators.67 Indeed, if organizations decide to obey a particular jurisdiction’s requirements in all
their activities, then that jurisdiction will gain influence even if other
jurisdictions might strongly prefer a different rule, so long as the superregulator’s demands do not actually violate the law in other places.
While the literature names certain cross-jurisdictional effects after particular superregulators who are especially likely to cause them,
it is a mistake to overinterpret these names. As we shall see, superregulators can affect other jurisdictions in various ways.68 So, for example, when other nations adopt new data protection laws to harmonize
their rules with those in the EU, this is a California Effect that happens
to emanate from Brussels. When websites began posting globally applicable privacy policies partly in response to a 2003 California statute
requiring they do so,69 this was a Brussels Effect triggered by a California law. We will delve into these catalytic effects in privacy law
62. Id. at 6.
63. Id. at 10–19; see also Schwartz, supra note 9, at 780–83 (discussing and applying Bradford’s factors).
64. Bradford, supra note 28, at 11–12.
65. Id. at 12–17.
66. Id. at 17–19.
67. See supra Parts I.A–B; Bradford, supra note 28, at 48–49.
68. See infra Part III.
69. California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§§ 22575–22579 (2018).
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more fully below.70 First, however, we explain the substance of the
GDPR and the CCPA, demonstrating in the process both their overlaps
and differences and revealing the emergence of California as a contender to be a data privacy superregulator.
II. GDPR VERSUS CCPA
Which data privacy regime is driving the wave of legislative activity related to data privacy across the United States, and what is the
mechanism of that influence? To answer this question, we need first
to understand the two regimes. This Part reveals both similarities and
differences between the GDPR and the CCPA. After all, if the CCPA can
be described as a copy of the GDPR, then even if we can show that state
legislators and Congress are copying California, Schwartz and others
would be correct that the European Union is the ultimate source behind new U.S. privacy proposals.71 But if, as we argue, the CCPA is a
fundamentally different regime—only similar to the GDPR at the surface, while lacking major structural elements of the GDPR—then the
question of who the superregulator is becomes one with meaningful
consequences for understanding all these federal and state proposals.72
A paperback of the GDPR runs some 130 pages, its sections literally divided into chapters.73 The CCPA, by contrast, is around 25
pages.74 The two laws were also written on vastly different timelines.
If the GDPR is a doctoral thesis, the CCPA is a term paper written the
night before the deadline.75
In this Part, we compare the two regimes, addressing where they
apply, whom they cover, and what they require. We also address differences in the regulatory style, enforcement mechanisms, and legal
70. See infra Part III.
71. See supra notes 7–14 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 6 (listing data privacy bills proposed in Congress in 2019 and
2020).
73. Eur. Union, European Data Protection Law: General Data Protection Regulation 2016, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/European-Data-Protection-Law
-Regulation/dp/1533170835 [https://perma.cc/2JW7-YDHP].
74. See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–.199
(2018).
75. Compare Katelyn Ringrose & Jeremy Greenberg, California Privacy Legislation: A Timeline of Key Events, FUTURE PRIV. F. (Aug. 31, 2020), https://fpf.org/blog/
california-privacy-legislation-a-timeline-of-key-events [https://perma.cc/C6NC
-WVZR], with Adam Deakin, GDPR Timeline: A History of Data Protection, VUTURE,
https://vutu.re/blog/gdpr-timeline--a-history-of-data-protection.aspx [https://
perma.cc/2JS2-SHS7].
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settings of the GDPR and the CCPA. This understanding of the two systems sets up our analysis in Part III, where we consider the influence
of the new European and Californian laws across the United States.
A. EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION VERSUS U.S. CONSUMER PROTECTION
First, it helps to understand the fundamental differences between
a U.S.-style and an EU-style data privacy regime. When discussing data
governance, European lawyers do not even use the same language as
American lawyers; they refer to statutes that govern the handling of
personal data as “data protection” laws, not “privacy” laws.76 This reflects a fundamental difference in approach: “data protection” is universal in Europe, while most American law focuses on “consumer protection.”77 Data protection laws like the GDPR proceed from the
principle that data protection is a fundamental human right safeguarded through constitutional protections in the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter.78 This places data protection rights on the same plane as free speech or due process.79 As a
result, the default in Europe is that personal information cannot be
collected or processed unless there is a specific legal justification for
doing so.80
In the United States, by contrast, privacy law most often follows
a “consumer protection” model, with regulators focused on ensuring
that consumers receive the benefit of their bargain in individual business-to-consumer transactions.81 The consumer protection model frequently relies on the much-criticized premise that disclosure and a
right of refusal (so-called “notice and choice”) adequately empower
76. See Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law,
106 GEO. L.J. 115, 138, 147 (2017); see also CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA
PROTECTION LAW: CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND REGULATION 2–3 (2d ed. 2007); James Q.
Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J.
1151, 1159–60 (2004); Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902,
909–10 (2009); Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in
the U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 500–01 (1995).
77. McGeveran, supra note 20, at 966 (“[D]ata protection law begins with an assumption that control over personal information is a human right. . . . U.S. regulators,
such as the FTC or state attorneys general, regulate privacy by policing the fairness of
particular transactions.”).
78. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, arts. 7–8, 2000 O.J. (C
364) 11; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
79. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 78, arts. 7,
11.
80. See id. art. 8.
81. See McGeveran, supra note 20, at 966.
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consumers.82 Unlike in Europe, there is no protection in the U.S. Constitution against activities by nongovernmental entities,83 including
the collection of personal data. And unlike a data protection regime, in
which protections follow the data, the consumer protection model focuses on governing both a more discrete interaction and a more direct
relationship. Until the CCPA, most American law permitted entities to
collect and use personal data however they wished by default, absent
a specific legal rule forbidding a particular practice.84
A second difference between Europe and the United States is that
U.S. privacy law has always been fragmented and “sectoral.”85 Different statutes are enforced by different regulators in different sectors
such as health care, financial services, education, or credit reporting.
A few of these sectoral regimes are constructed like data protection
rules, but they apply only within their narrow domains.86 Most U.S.
laws function on the transactional consumer protection model described above. As a final backstop, general-purpose consumer protection regulators, such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and state
attorneys general, address a subset of cases falling outside any sectoral rules, again largely following a consumer protection model.87
By contrast, in every European nation, specialized data protection regulators have long enforced omnibus statutes applicable to all
organizations when they handle any personal data.88 While these data
protection laws contain extra protections for especially sensitive
82. See, e.g., WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE
DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 62–67 (2018); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1930 (2013).
83. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195–96
(1989) (“[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State
to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.”).
84. See Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 76, at 147.
85. See Reidenberg, supra note 76, at 505–06; Schwartz, supra note 76, at 908–
13.
86. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162, 164
(2020); Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506.
87. Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 748 (2016); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and
the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 590 (2014); see also
McGeveran, supra note 20, at 977–78 (describing the “cleanup role” of consumer protection regulators in enforcement of U.S. privacy law).
88. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 78, art. 8
(“Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.”);
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
16(1), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 (“Everyone has the right to the protection of
personal data concerning them.”).
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information, their basic human rights frameworks impose uniform requirements every time personal data is collected, processed, or transferred.89 These rules apply through sweeping definitions of “data controllers” and “data processors” that encompass not only businesses of
every size and type but also governments, nonprofit organizations,
political campaigns, and even individuals—anyone engaged in the
“processing” of personal data.90
B. SUBSTANTIVE SIMILARITIES
At first glance, the CCPA may seem more “European” than existing U.S. privacy laws. True, it is the first U.S. statute that has some data
protection characteristics without being narrowly sectoral. For example, under the CCPA, legal protections follow personal data, regardless
of whether an individual has a direct relationship with the regulated
company.91 This differs from many existing regulatory models in the
United States. Because the FTC’s general consumer protection authority focuses only on the relationship between individuals and companies, it claims to have little power over data brokers who obtain individual information from other companies or public sources rather
than from consumers themselves.92 The CCPA, by contrast, regulates
89. The European Commission’s review of the operation of the GDPR at its second
anniversary noted that the EU member states had not offered as much uniformity in
their local implementations of the GDPR as might be desired. Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Data Protection as a Pillar of
Citizens’ Empowerment and the EU’s Approach to the Digital Transition – Two Years of
Application of the General Data Protection Regulation, at 12, COM (2020) 264 final
(June 24, 2020), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%
3A52020DC0264 [https://perma.cc/HSY9-LCUU].
90. GDPR, supra note 7, art. 4(2) (defining “processing” as “any operation or set
of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether
or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring,
storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction”); see Case C-40/17, Fashion ID GmbH & Co. KG v. Verbraucherzentrale NRW e.V., ECLI:EU:C:2019:629 (July 29, 2019) (holding Facebook
jointly responsible as a data controller when a third-party website uses a Facebook
“Like” button that facilitates user tracking). The first European Court of Justice case
dealing with the GDPR’s predecessor, the Data Protection Directive, involved a criminal charge against an individual who had posted (seemingly innocuous) information
about fellow parishioners to a webpage without their consent. Case C-101/01, Lindqvist v. Åklagarkammaren i Jönköping, 2003 E.C.R. I-12971.
91. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(d) (Deering 2018).
92. U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data
-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may
-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/TR62-497D].

1750

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:1733

data brokers directly—a critical move targeting an industry that has
an enormous impact on individuals’ privacy.93
Some core elements of the CCPA also seem to echo aspects of the
GDPR. Both laws define personal information very broadly, far beyond
most existing U.S. privacy laws.94 Both laws foundationally emphasize
transparency, reflecting the Fair Information Principles on which
many data privacy regimes in both Europe and the United States are
built, and both laws share the contours of a number of additional individual rights.95
In the past, narrow definitions of personal information have
sharply limited the effect of many U.S. privacy laws.96 Under most U.S.
laws, only certain types of information counted as personal data, making the definition limited, technical, and static. The GDPR and CCPA
both break with this past by using the real-world potential for identifiability as the touchstone. The GDPR’s broad and open definition of
personal data includes not just information that directly identifies a
person, but also information that renders a person identifiable.97 The
CCPA similarly applies to information that is “capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a
particular consumer or household.”98 Both laws provide expansive
and open lists of examples of covered personal information, from IP
addresses to biometric information.
Another similarity between the GDPR and the CCPA is the central
role of transparency. Transparency is a core principle of the GDPR.99
The GDPR’s recitals proclaim it a fundamental tenet of data protection
law that people should know that personal data has been collected
and be able to understand the extent to which that information is processed.100 The CCPA likewise focuses on giving people notice and
93. JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION 7 (2014) (“Stalkers and rogue employees have
consistently found ways to abuse these databases.”). The federal Fair Credit Reporting
Act, a narrow sectoral statute, does regulate some segments of the data broker industry, but largely within the context of business relationships among credit reporting
agencies and the lenders or employers who rely on their products. 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
94. See GDPR, supra note 7; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.
95. GDPR, supra note 7; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.
96. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010); Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The
PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1814 (2011).
97. GDPR, supra note 7, art. 4(1).
98. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1).
99. GDPR, supra note 7, art. 5(1)(a).
100. Id. recital 39.
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access rights so that they can trace what is happening to their personal
information. The California legislature’s articulated intent for the
CCPA was to give consumers “an effective way to control their personal information” by giving them “[t]he right . . . to know what personal information is being collected about them,” and “[t]he right . . .
to know whether their personal information is sold or disclosed and
to whom.”101
Beyond this hortatory language, both laws embed transparency
principles in their requirements. Under the GDPR, organizations must
provide individuals both notice and access.102 They must affirmatively
provide detailed general notice that includes the purpose of data processing, the recipients of the data, the period for which the data will
be stored, and other information.103 Organizations that collect personal information from a third party must also provide such notice,104
and all these disclosures must be clear and intelligible.105
The GDPR also establishes a right of individual access,106 building
on “subject access rights” that have been in place throughout Europe
at least since the 1990s under the Data Protection Directive.107 In response to an individual’s access request, data controllers must disclose, among other things: the purposes of processing, the categories
of personal information concerned, the recipients of personal data, retention or storage time, and the source of the data if they have not
been collected from the individual.108 Additionally, they must provide
a copy of the data itself in a commonly used electronic form.109
The CCPA likewise gives individuals both notice and access
rights. Like the GDPR, it requires companies to disclose the purpose of
processing, categories of information gathered, and the existence of
individual rights with respect to that data (it does not, however, require disclosure of the precise identities of the recipients of the data
or the storage period).110 Such disclosures, according to regulations
101. See Assemb. 375, 2018 Leg. § 2(i) (Cal. 2018).
102. GDPR, supra note 7, arts. 13–14.
103. Id.
104. Id. art. 14(1)(d).
105. Id. art. 12.
106. Id. art. 15.
107. Jef Ausloos & Pierre Dewitte, Shattering One-Way Mirrors—Data Subject Access Rights in Practice, 8 INT’L DATA PRIV. L. 4, 4–28 (2018).
108. GDPR, supra note 7, art. 15.
109. Id. art. 15(3); see also id. recital 63 (“Where possible, the controller should be
able to provide remote access to a secure system which would provide the data subject
with direct access to his or her personal data.”).
110. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.185 (2018); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.305 (2020).
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promulgated by California’s attorney general, must be “designed and
presented in a way that is easy to read and understandable to consumers.”111 The CCPA goes well beyond notice requirements in prior U.S.
law, such as a California statute requiring websites to post privacy policies.112
Like the GDPR, the CCPA also gives individuals access rights. The
statute creates a right for consumers to request both the categories
and specific pieces of personal information that a business has collected.113 Consumers have a right to request disclosure of the categories of sources from which the personal information is collected, the
business or commercial purpose for collecting, and the categories of
third parties with whom the business shares personal information.114
Unusually for a U.S. law, the rules apply not just to companies that
have a direct relationship with the consumer, but also to companies
that collect and sell personal information even if they obtain that information from somebody other than the consumer.115 CCPA access
rights represent a significant advance from very limited rights under
previous law, such as access to credit scoring information and the annual free credit report.116
The two regimes share, too, the core elements of a number of additional individual rights (though they differ in the details): data portability, opt-out rights, a duty of nondiscrimination, and a right to deletion or erasure. The GDPR contains a right to data portability—that is,
a right to receive one’s personal data in a format that enables an individual to switch service providers.117 This right is aimed at giving individuals more control over their data and more choices about IT services118 but is also understood to potentially enhance competition.119
The CCPA quietly creates a data portability “right” of its own: personal
data delivered electronically in response to an access request “shall be

111. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.305(2).
112. CAL. CIV. CODE § 22575 (Deering 2014).
113. Id. §§ 1798.100(a), .110(a); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, §§ 999.300(q), .308(c)(1),
.318.
114. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.110(a).
115. Under the CCPA, consumers can request access to certain information from
(a) a business that collects personal information and (b) a business that sells personal
information or discloses it for a business purpose. Id. §§ 1798.100(a), .110(a), .115(a).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(g).
117. GDPR, supra note 7, art. 20, recital 68; ARTICLE 29 DATA PROT. WORKING PARTY,
GUIDELINES ON THE RIGHT TO DATA PORTABILITY (2017).
118. ARTICLE 29 DATA PROT. WORKING PARTY, supra note 117, at 3–4.
119. Id. at 4.
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in a portable and . . . readily usable format.”120 In fact, the CCPA’s data
portability “right” may be broader than the GDPR’s in some ways, as it
applies to inferred data about an individual, where the GDPR’s right
does not.121
Both the CCPA and the GDPR contain a right for individuals to
“opt out” and deny permission for handling of their personal data in
certain ways. The CCPA establishes an opt-out right for consumers to
tell a business not to sell their personal information.122 If a business
has actual knowledge that a consumer is sixteen years old or younger,
it must obtain affirmative authorization (“opt-in”) for any sale of personal information—from the individual themselves if they are between thirteen and sixteen years old or from a parent or guardian if
the individual is under thirteen years old.123 The GDPR, by comparison, establishes three analogous rights: the right to restrict data processing,124 the right to object to data processing,125 and the right to
withdraw consent.126 Although the GDPR has broader rights to opt
out—they apply well beyond the sale of information—they are also
less absolute than those in the CCPA.127
Both regimes contain a duty of nondiscrimination: companies
cannot “discriminate” against individuals who choose to exercise
rights related to personal data.128 This means that a business cannot,
for example, deny goods or services, charge different rates, impose
120. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100(d).
121. ARTICLE 29 DATA PROT. WORKING PARTY, supra note 117, at 10; CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1798.140(o), (l), (k), (m).
122. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120. Vermont’s new data broker law, H. 764, requires
transparency as to whether a data broker allows consumers to opt out of collection or
sale of information but does not require a data broker to do so. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§ 2430 (2019).
123. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120(d).
124. GDPR, supra note 7, art. 18.
125. Id. art. 21, recitals 60, 70.
126. Id. art. 7(3).
127. Id. art. 2(1). There is also a balancing test specific to scientific or historical
research purposes or statistical purposes. Id. art. 21(6).
128. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.125; GDPR, supra note 7, recital 42; EUR. DATA PROT. BD.,
GUIDELINES 05/2020 ON CONSENT UNDER REGULATION 2016/679 ¶ 48 (2020), https://
edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_202005_consent_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PK3G-F7MP] (giving as an example of “consent without detriment”
that a company may “show that a service includes the possibility to withdraw consent
without negative consequences e.g. without the performance of the service being
downgraded to the detriment of the user”); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.336(a) (2020)
(“A financial incentive or a price or service difference is discriminatory, and therefore
prohibited . . . if the business treats a consumer differently because the consumer exercised a right conferred by the CCPA or these regulations.”).
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penalties, or provide a different level of services to customers who opt
out of data transactions. The CCPA regulations, however, contemplate
a compensation scheme whereby a business can offer financial incentives or a price or service difference if they are “reasonably related to
the value of the consumer’s data.”129 This changes the duty of nondiscrimination in at least some circumstances from an absolute duty into
an information-forcing mechanism regarding how companies value
consumer data.130
The GDPR famously contains a right to erasure, also known as the
“right to be forgotten.”131 The CCPA creates a more limited right to deletion.132 The GDPR’s right to erasure gives individuals the right to obtain the erasure of personal data both from companies with which
they have a direct consumer relationship and from third parties, under certain circumstances.133 There are exceptions to the right to erasure, including freedom of expression and public interest in the area of
public health.134 As many have noted, this so-called “right to be forgotten” is not absolute but is in large part a balancing test between competing values, outsourced to private companies.135 The CCPA creates
a much narrower right to deletion. Unlike the GDPR’s right to erasure,
which applies to third parties, the CCPA’s right to deletion applies only
to businesses that collect information directly from the consumer.136
129. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.336(b).
130. See id. § 999.337.
131. GDPR, supra note 7, art. 17. See generally MEG LETA JONES, CTRL + Z: THE RIGHT
TO BE FORGOTTEN (2016).
132. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105 (2018).
133. GDPR, supra note 7, art. 17(1)(a)–(f) (permitting an individual to exercise the
right to erasure in circumstances including, but not limited to, when the personal data
is no longer necessary for the purpose it was originally collected or processed for, the
individual withdraws their consent where the organization relied on said consent as
the lawful basis of processing, or when the individual objects to the processing of their
data for direct marketing purposes).
134. Id. art. 17(3)(a), (c).
135. See CHRISTINA ANGELOPOULOS, ANNABEL BRODY, WOUTER HINS, BERNT
HUGENHOLTZ, PATRICK LEERSSEN, THOMAS MARGONI, TARLACH MCGONAGLE, OT VAN DAALEN
& JORIS VAN HOBOKEN, INST. FOR INFO. L., STUDY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS LIMITATIONS FOR
ONLINE
ENFORCEMENT
THROUGH
SELF-REGULATION
52
(2015),
https://
scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/access/item%3A2869513/view [https://
perma.cc/AAM8-UABW]; see also Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. AEPD,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, 16–22 (May 13, 2014); Edward Lee, Recognizing Rights in Real
Time: The Role of Google in the EU Right To Be Forgotten, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1017
(2016); Stefan Kulk & Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Case Note, Google Spain v. González: Did the Court Forget About Freedom of Expression?, 5 EUR. J. RISK REGUL. 389, 389–
98 (2014).
136. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(a).
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This more restricted scope is an accommodation of First Amendment
law and values in the United States, which may constrain erasure requirements imposed on third parties.137
In sum, the CCPA moves closer to a data protection regime like
the GDPR in certain ways, which helps explain the widespread assumption that it represents a U.S. embrace of the European-style data
protection model. While the CCPA’s broad definition of personal data,
emphasis on transparency, and establishment of some individual
rights do go further than previous U.S. law, none of these shifts go
nearly as far as the GDPR. As we shall see in the next Section, these
similarities are overshadowed by fundamental substantive differences between the two models.
C. SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES
Once an analysis moves beyond these similarities, it becomes
clear that the CCPA regime differs sharply from the GDPR. First, and
perhaps most importantly, the two laws do not share the same underlying principles, leading to great differences in the scope and nature
of the rights and duties imposed by each. Second, while the CCPA is
broader than past American sectoral laws, it still regulates a much narrower set of entities than does the GDPR. Third, the two laws have different enforcement mechanisms. Fourth, their regulatory styles contrast, with significant practical and substantive consequences. And
finally, California and Europe are each quite distinct in what we call
their “legal setting”—the backdrop against which privacy laws exist
and will develop over time. We consider each of these differences in
order.
First and foremost, for all its moves toward broader coverage and
the creation of individual rights, the CCPA does not treat privacy as a
human right in the way data protection laws like the GDPR do.138 It
137. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011); see Anupam Chander &
Uyên P. Lê, Free Speech, 100 IOWA L. REV. 501, 522 (2015) (arguing that Sorrell demonstrates “the seriousness of First Amendment constraints on privacy regulations on information intermediaries”). Cases such as Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), and Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing, 443
U.S. 97 (1979), arguably suggest that once information is legally distributed, the government cannot restrict its use absent state interest of the highest order. However, a
number of scholars argue that most privacy laws can pass First Amendment muster.
See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1501 (2015); Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016). But see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right To Stop People from Speaking
About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000).
138. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105, with GDPR, supra note 7, art. 1.
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remains, in the American tradition, a transactional privacy law concerned with protecting consumers in their dealings with commercial
entities. For this reason, the CCPA does not embrace several principles
that have been at the core of constitutionally influenced European
data protection law since long before the GDPR—back to its predecessor, the 1995 Data Protection Directive,139 and back even further to
national data protection laws in many European countries dating from
the 1970s and 1980s.140
The GDPR is built around the concept of “lawful processing” of
data. That is, personal data cannot be processed unless a data controller has obtained individual consent141 or one of five other enumerated
categories of lawful processing applies.142 The CCPA does not require
that processing be lawful.143 Rather, it shares the presumption of most
other American privacy law that personal data may be collected, used,
or disclosed unless a specific legal rule forbids these activities.144 This
is likely the single most meaningful difference between the two regimes.
Moreover, the GDPR imposes multiple additional conditions on
all data processing, even when it is authorized by consent or another
of the legitimizing conditions.145 The GDPR requires that personal
data may be collected only for “specified, explicit and legitimate purposes,” stated at the time of collection.146 Additional principles include
purpose limitation (processing data only for those previously stated
purposes), data minimization (collecting no more data than necessary
for those purposes), data retention (limiting storage of data to periods
justified by those purposes), privacy by design, as well as privacy impact assessments for high risk data processing, among others.147

139. Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31.
140. See, e.g., Gesetz zum Schutz vor MiBbrauch personenbezogener Daten bei der
Datenverarbeitung (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz - BDSG) [Law on Protection Against the
Misuse of Personal Data in Data Processing (Federal Data Protection Act)], Jan. 27,
1977, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBI] at 1 201 (W. Ger.); Loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978
de informatiqué et libertés [Law 78-17 of January 6, 1978 on Information and Civil
Liberties], COMMISION NATIONALE DE L’INFORMATIQUÉ ET DES LIBERTÉS [COMMISSION ON
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, DATA FILES AND CIVIL LIBERTIES] (Fr.); Data Protection Act
1984, c. 35 (U.K.).
141. GDPR, supra note 7, art. 6(1)(a).
142. Id. art. 6(1)(a)–(f).
143. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100.
144. Id.
145. GDPR, supra note 7, art. 5(1).
146. Id. art. 5(1)(b).
147. Id. art. 5(1)(b)–(f).
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The CCPA imposes few requirements concerning the purposes
for data collection or the proportionality of data handling to those purposes. The CCPA’s text does not even go as far as the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which requires that
downstream disclosures of patient data be the “minimum necessary”
to achieve a purpose.148 Instead, the CCPA requires a business to provide notice if it is “collect[ing] personal information collected for additional purposes.”149 This rule on its face does not stop companies
from using data for new purposes—it just requires disclosure if they
do so. As in many other places, the CCPA’s approach relies on transparency rather than following the GDPR by imposing substantive duties on companies that collect and process personal data. The implementing regulations promulgated by the California attorney general
do require that a business “shall not use a consumer’s personal information for a purpose materially different than those disclosed in the
notice at collection.”150 If a business wishes to use personal information for a new, undisclosed, materially different purpose, it must
obtain explicit consent from the consumer for that use. While this is
more than mere transparency, it is far from the extensive conditions
on all data processing in the GDPR.
The divergence in the two regimes’ animating principles also influences their treatment of individual rights. The CCPA, apart from allowing individuals to opt out of sales of their personal data, affords
individuals little control. It does nothing to enable individuals to refuse to give companies their data in the first place. The GDPR strives
to do so by requiring stringent forms of consent in a number of circumstances151 and by granting individuals robust rights throughout
the life cycle of data processing, including the right to rectification of
incorrect information;152 the right to prevent automated individual
decision-making and to receive explanation of any automated decision;153 and broader rights related to erasure of data and withdrawal

148. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(b), .514(d) (2021).
149. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100(b) (2018).
150. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.305(a)(5) (withdrawn July 29, 2020).
151. Regarding both particularly sensitive data (special categories of data) and automated decision-making, the GDPR requires the more stringent “explicit consent” if
consent is to be the basis of processing. GDPR, supra note 7; ARTICLE 29 DATA PROT.
WORKING PARTY, GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING AND PROFILING
FOR THE PURPOSES OF REGULATION (2017).
152. GDPR, supra note 7, art. 16.
153. Id. art. 22; see also Margot E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, 34
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 189, 201 (2019).
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of consent.154 Additionally, the GDPR’s requirement of lawful processing bestows more individual control than the CCPA.155 The CCPA
relies primarily on transparency, and apart from access and notice
rights, grants individuals only the two limited rights discussed above:
to opt out of sale and to request deletion.156
Fundamentally, then, the CCPA is not a comprehensive Europeanstyle data protection regime. The GDPR quintessentially targets compliance from an organizational perspective: it attempts to build up a
particular kind of responsible corporate infrastructure, including internal positions and processes.157 The GDPR’s affirmative regulatory
requirements range from data minimization to risk assessments to recording requirements, and they are imposed on data collectors even
where there is not a corresponding individual right.158 The CCPA regulations require compliance training and record-keeping,159 but overall appear to be geared more towards providing transparency into industry practices—in this case, how a company responds to consumer
requests under the CCPA—than towards reinforcing good data practices or creating substantive protections for consumers. It remains to
be seen if the GDPR will succeed in entrenching more privacy-protective corporate practices, but its aims are far broader, and approach far
deeper, than the CCPA’s.
A second difference between the GDPR and CCPA relates to regulated entities. As noted earlier, the GDPR covers anyone that processes
personal data, including not only companies but also individuals, nonprofit organizations, and governments.160 The CCPA applies only to
businesses, and only to those that meet a complex set of overlapping
requirements related to their size or the extent of their involvement
in personal data trade.161 Here again, the two laws reflect the
154. GDPR, supra note 7, art. 17.
155. Id. art. 6(1)(a).
156. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120 (2018).
157. See Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach
to Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529, 1596 (2019).
158. GDPR, supra note 7, art. 5(2); see also Kaminski, supra note 157.
159. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.317 (2020).
160. GDPR, supra note 7, art. 2(1).
161. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100, .105, .110, .115, .120. The CCPA targets three kinds
of commercial entities as “businesses.” Id. § 1798.140(c). It targets (1) larger businesses (with over twenty-five million dollars in annual gross revenue) that collect California residents’ personal data, regardless of how many people are impacted by this
collection; (2) for-profit businesses of any size that buy, receive, sell, or share personal
information concerning a significant number of residents (50,000 or more); and (3)
businesses that derive half or more of their annual revenues from selling personal information—regardless of their size or how many people are affected by this activity.
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dominant approach on each side of the Atlantic. A data protection
model inherently aims to be comprehensive. The CCPA, while broader
than many sectoral U.S. privacy laws of the past, still limits its aim to
protecting consumers from certain data handling practices within a
specific context defined by commerciality, geography, and scale.
The regimes’ respective enforcement mechanisms are a third
area of divergence. Both provide for monetary penalties for non-compliance. The GDPR authorizes administrative fines issued by national
data protection regulators of up to 4% of a company’s annual worldwide revenue, while the CCPA includes civil penalties of up to $2,500
per violation or $7,500 per intentional violation, a number that can
exact enormous sums when multiplied by the number of people affected in many privacy violations.162 However, there is no private right
of action for affected individuals to enforce most elements of the
CCPA. This is in keeping with the trend for U.S. privacy laws of at least
the last twenty years, including the FTC Act,163 HIPAA,164 and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA).165 There have been
proposals in the California legislature to authorize private CCPA lawsuits, but for now only the state attorney general may enforce most
provisions of the law.166 In Europe, a constitutionally guaranteed right
of redress for violations of individual rights means the GDPR can be
enforced by individual complaints.167 While class actions are largely
unfamiliar in European law, the GDPR does allow a claims representation model so that individuals do not have to file claims on their own
behalf only. There is also a well-developed regulatory structure in the
GDPR, with specialized data protection regulatory authorities in each
EU country and coordination of their efforts through a European Data
Protection Board.168 Although the recently enacted California Privacy
Rights Act (CPRA) establishes a new privacy-specific regulator,169
there is no tradition of dedicated data protection regulators in the
United States, which instead relies on agencies with numerous other
162. GDPR, supra note 7, art. 83; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.155(a)–(b).
163. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58.
164. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 45 C.F.R. § 160.203
(2002).
165. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506.
166. The CCPA does, however, authorize private lawsuits for a narrow set of claims
related to data security breaches.
167. GDPR, supra note 7, arts. 77–79.
168. Id. arts. 51–59.
169. See Lydia de la Torre & Glenn Brown, What Is the California Privacy Protection
Agency?, IAPP (Nov. 23, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/what-is-the-california
-privacy-protection-agency [https://perma.cc/QL6A-CYDP].
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obligations, including the FTC, state attorneys general, and sectoral
regulators in areas such as health, banking, or education.
Fourth, the regulatory styles of the two regimes differ greatly.
This can create both substantive and cultural gaps. The CCPA establishes limited but granular requirements that California’s attorney
general has fleshed out further in recently promulgated regulations.170 The GDPR, on the other hand, consists of broad standards in
its text and relies heavily on cooperation with companies and various
forms of guidance (including the GDPR’s Recitals, European Data Protection Board Guidelines, and interpretations from individual national
data protection authorities) to fill in the details.171 In other words, the
GDPR’s approach to regulation exemplifies collaborative governance,
also known as “coregulation” or “new governance.”172 The GDPR’s
vagueness is arguably deliberate. EU authorities wanted to allow companies and sectors to fill in details of how to comply with the law over
time, whether formally by establishing codes of conduct or certification mechanisms (although these have yet to materialize more than
two years after the GDPR came into force),173 or informally through
self-regulation, recording and reporting, impact assessments, and ongoing conversations with regulators.174 By contrast, the CCPA’s granularity appears, in places, to value detail and certainty over adaptability.
For example, where the GDPR simply states that it requires clarity and intelligibility in its access and notice rights, the statutory text
of the CCPA specifies that companies provide a toll-free telephone
number and website address for consumers to make access requests.175 For those businesses subject to the CCPA’s opt-out, the
CCPA mandates a clear and conspicuous link titled “Do Not Sell My
Personal Information” and a description of the consumer’s right to opt
out of the sale of personal data.176 The CCPA regulations go into even
more detail about the precise mode and content required for notice at
170. Final Text of Proposed Regulations, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, §§ 999.300–.337, CAL.
OFF. ATT’Y GEN., https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/oal-sub-final
-text-of-regs.pdf [https://perma.cc/CT9M-4G7M].
171. See Kaminski, supra note 157; McGeveran, supra note 20.
172. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,
45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 31 (1997); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and
the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 349
(2004).
173. GDPR, supra note 7, arts. 40, 42.
174. See Kaminski, supra note 157; McGeveran, supra note 20.
175. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.130(a)(1) (2018).
176. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.305(f)(1) (2020).
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collection, notice of opt-out, notice of financial incentive, and privacy
policies.177 These examples demonstrate a stylistic difference between the two laws that could have real consequences for businesses
trying to comply with both. For certain obligations, the CCPA and its
regulations offer a clear, if inflexible, roadmap for compliance. Often,
however, it is so detailed that it creates the possibility of divergence
from the GDPR—even where in broad strokes the two laws might appear similar.
Finally, the backdrop against which these two privacy laws were
enacted, or what we call their legal setting, differs significantly. While
the CCPA is constrained by increasingly deregulatory First Amendment doctrine, the GDPR is backed by European courts that have increasingly recognized the importance of both privacy and data protection as fundamental rights.178 In recent years, these courts have
applied the right to be forgotten to search engines,179 found the Data
Retention Directive to violate fundamental rights,180 and twice invalidated the primary mechanism for transferring data to the United
States because of fears that American national security surveillance
would trample on Europeans’ rights.181
Crucially, European constitutional structures enforce affirmative
rights against private conduct, not just against state actors as in the
United States.182 And, while European constitutional traditions safeguard the right to freedom of expression, it is usually balanced against
other rights, and it can and does often lose out to constitutional data
protection rights.183 By contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court in recent
years has interpreted free speech doctrine to restrict both data privacy regulations and other consumer protection disclosure regimes.184 Some observers worry that the First Amendment is becoming an increasingly blunt tool, subjecting many regulations concerning
177. Id. §§ 999.305–.308.
178. Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 76.
179. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, 22 (May 13,
2014).
180. Case C-293/12, Digit. Rts. Ir. Ltd. v. Minister for Commc’ns, Marine & Nat. Res.,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, 19 (Apr. 4, 2014).
181. Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, 10–31
(Oct. 6, 2015); Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd.,
ECLI:EU:C:2020:559 (July 16, 2020).
182. See Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 76, at 126, 155.
183. Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 73, 90–149 (2008); Bilyana Petkova, Privacy as
Europe’s First Amendment, 25 EUR. L.J. 140, 152 (2019).
184. See infra Part III.D.2.
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privacy and other topics to often-fatal strict scrutiny.185 Additionally,
the Supreme Court has been skeptical of data privacy harms, in cases
addressing both privacy damages and standing to sue.186 The U.S. Constitution contains no explicit data privacy right, and the Fourth
Amendment protects only against state action, not the actions of private parties.187
Overall, these five differences overshadow the similarities. Asserting that the CCPA is remotely equivalent to a data protection regime like the GDPR overstates the importance of a few resemblances.
It is true that the CCPA departs from some common characteristics of
previous U.S. privacy law and that it overlaps with some aspects of the
GDPR. But the California law’s motivations, mechanisms, scope, and
legal setting keep it well within the consumer protection tradition of
American privacy law. The question now is which of these two fundamentally different laws is catalyzing the recent legislative activity
around privacy in Congress and state legislatures.
III. CATALYZING PRIVACY
The standard account of transatlantic privacy describes two fundamentally incompatible privacy regimes reflecting deep philosophical divides between legal cultures. According to this story, a laissezfaire approach to data privacy in the United States reflects broader
liberal norms that prioritize individual autonomy in the face of big
government, while the more interventionist EU approach reflects “social-protection norms” aimed at protecting human dignity.188 Researchers (including one of us) have argued that this conventional
wisdom oversimplifies matters by focusing on disparities in law-onthe-books and ignoring similarities in practices-on-the-ground.189
Nonetheless, the EU and United States have been unable, or at least
185. See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right To Record, 97 B.U. L. REV.
167, 173 (2017); Scott Skinner-Thompson, Recording as Heckling, 108 GEO. L.J. 125,
146 (2019); Richards, supra note 137, at 1524. See generally Amanda Shanor, The New
Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133.
186. See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004); FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284 (2012);
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013); Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct.
1540 (2016); Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041 (2019).
187. Some state constitutions do, however, provide an explicit right to privacy,
even against private parties. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All people are by nature
free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending . . . privacy.”).
188. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules
in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1343 (2000); Whitman, supra note 76, at 1161.
189. Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 20, at 260; McGeveran, supra note 20, at
960.
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disinclined, to come to an international consensus on data privacy, instead forging sui generis and unstable bilateral arrangements governing data transfers between the two regimes.190
The CCPA and the GDPR herald a possible paradigm shift for data
privacy. Rather than two fundamentally incompatible frameworks,
one European and one American, we identify the emergence of a race
between California and the European Union as regulatory catalysts,
driving the U.S. states, and possibly the U.S. federal government, to enact new data privacy laws.191
This Part first outlines the argument that the GDPR has been the
dominant influence on both de facto and de jure spread of privacy law
worldwide. We argue that the United States represents an exception
to this narrative—a narrative that largely, and in our view mistakenly,
adheres to a notion of nation-states (and supranational entities) as
unitary actors rather than considering the various players within
them.192
We then examine a number of recently proposed and several recently enacted state and federal data privacy laws, aiming to answer
the question: which jurisdiction is driving this race to propose and enact new privacy rules? We find that although the commonly accepted
narrative credits new strong European rules as the driver,193 in fact,
the proposals in U.S. states have largely copied California. And although the CCPA does not always provide the substantive content for
recently proposed federal legislation, it has been the impetus behind
those bills. California, not Europe, is catalyzing the recent and ongoing
development of U.S. data privacy law.
The story of the CCPA and its imitators, we argue, is not the commonly assumed story about the unilateral power of Brussels. It
190. See cases cited supra note 181.
191. Sara Merken, States Follow EU, California in Push for Consumer Privacy Laws
(1), BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 6, 2019, 3:02 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy
-and-data-security/states-follow-eu-california-in-push-for-consumer-privacy-laws-1.
192. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1401–09 (1999) (contrasting five theories of how international human rights law is enforced: power, self-interest, liberal explanations, communitarian explanations, and legal process explanations—and noting the role of
“transnational norm entrepreneurs” in legal process (in contrast to state-centric theories such as realism)); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 240, 241 (2000) (describing liberal IR theory as “a view that
preserves an important role for states but deprives them of their traditional opacity”
in contrast to traditional IR theory, “which conceive[s] of the international system as
composed of unitary, identical state actors with fixed preferences (the billiard ball
model)”).
193. See supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text.
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demonstrates instead how networked individuals can harness processes at the state and local level to promote the adoption of new legal
norms.194 Rather than causing a race to the bottom, the backdrop of
what we call “data globalization” both influences and empowers norm
entrepreneurs advocating for stricter requirements.195
Why are other states now copying the CCPA? We posit a number
of reasons. First, in an echo of the Delaware Effect, California may have
established itself nationally as an expert jurisdiction on data privacy
law, through both the CCPA and numerous earlier statutes regulating
data privacy.196 Second, since so many data-centered companies have
a significant presence in California, other states may be presuming a
California-driven “Brussels” Effect: that is, many companies already
complying with the CCPA with respect to California residents would
de facto comply with, or be readily able to comply with, CCPA-like requirements in other states. Third, state legislators motivated to enact
privacy protections are far more likely to model their laws on a
roughly twenty-page law from a U.S. jurisdiction than a foreign law
consisting of 99 articles and 173 recitals.
We do not deny that the GDPR influenced the direction of American privacy law. It certainly reduced the costs of compliance with new
American privacy law for multinationals that were already bringing
themselves into compliance with the GDPR. The strong new European
law also brought attention to the comparative deficit in U.S. law. But
the effect from the EU has been more circumscribed than generally
reported, and it is clearly secondary to a very real California Effect.
We will close Part III with some cautious predictions. We examine some of the countervailing forces unique to the United States that
may contain the spread of privacy rules from one jurisdiction to the
next, including the dormant commerce clause, the possibility of federal preemption, and the First Amendment. We hypothesize, however,
that the spread of data privacy law in the United States will continue,
with the CCPA as the new minimum threshold for protection. A new
data privacy equilibrium is being established in the United States,
whether it progresses state-by-state, encourages development of
194. See supra note 192.
195. For an argument of how to curtail the race to the bottom with respect to
online service providers, see ANUPAM CHANDER, THE ELECTRONIC SILK ROAD: HOW THE
WEB BINDS THE WORLD IN COMMERCE 166–69 (2013).
196. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22580 (California “Eraser Law” allowing minors the right to delete Internet content under certain circumstances); CAL CIV. CODE
§§ 1798.80–.84 (California’s pioneering data breach notification law); CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE §§ 22575–22579 (California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003, which required online privacy policies and other disclosures about handling of personal data).
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model state legislation, results in a uniform federal law, or some combination of the above.
A. BRUSSELS AS THE WORLD’S PRIVACY CATALYST
As Paul Schwartz and others have observed, the GDPR is driving
the enactment of new data privacy laws around the world.197 This
matches what we described in Part I as a (de jure) “California” Effect.198
The EU has strictly limited the export of personal data outside of
the EU since the 1995 Data Protection Directive came into effect, and
this policy continued in the GDPR.199 Both the Directive and the GDPR
allow crossborder transfers of personal data only in one of three ways.
Two of the methods are cumbersome, requiring individual companies
to go through complex, inflexible, and often bureaucratic processes to
adopt either “binding corporate rules” or “model contract clauses.”200
The third method is the “adequacy mechanism,” which operates on the
national level instead of at the level of an individual organization. If
the European Commission declares a foreign country’s data protection laws and enforcement to offer an “adequate level of protection,”201 then data can flow to any organization in that country with no
further constraint. Because an adequacy ruling greatly simplifies data
transfer in comparison to the more onerous options, many countries
have sought to modify their laws to obtain such a ruling.202
The adequacy process can thus be characterized as a deliberate
legal export strategy. By making it much easier for companies doing
business in the EU to transfer data across borders if their home jurisdictions adopt data protection laws that satisfy European authorities,
the EU deployed the Brussels Effect (de facto compliance) to cause a
California Effect (de jure regulatory changes). As Schwartz cautions,
the dynamic is more complicated in reality, because other jurisdictions have pushed back against the adequacy process, resulting in
197. See generally Schwartz, supra note 9, at 771 (“The cornerstone of EU law in
this area, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), is now widely regarded as a
privacy law not just for the EU, but for the world.”).
198. See supra Part I.B.
199. See GDPR, supra note 7, art. 45; Directive 95/46/EC, art. 25, 1995 O.J. (L 281).
200. GDPR, supra note 7, arts. 46–47 (describing binding corporate rules and
standard contractual clauses, among other mechanisms); Directive 95/46/EC, art. 25
(outlining procedures for derogations from Article 25 limitations on cross-border
transfers).
201. Directive 95/46/EC, art. 25(1).
202. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 786–95 (comparing UK, Japan, U.S. and noting
that Israel and others have received adequacy determinations).

1766

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:1733

more of a give-and-take than pure export.203 But at the end of the day,
the laws of other countries do look much more like EU law than they
did before their adequacy determinations.
The GDPR also demonstrates a (de facto) Brussels Effect, spurring many multinational companies to comply with its provisions
worldwide, even where other jurisdictions do not adjust their laws,
and not only for operations dealing with European persons. Some enterprises decided to avoid GDPR exposure by excluding Europe altogether.204 For example, the Los Angeles Times and the Chicago Tribune
disabled access for Internet users in the EU.205 National Public Radio
took a different approach: “Users could either agree to the new terms,
or decline and be taken to a plain-text version of the site, looking for
all the world like it had last been updated in 1996.”206 Chinese smarthome manufacturer Yeelight disabled Internet-connected lightbulbs
in the European Union.207 For these firms, even the potential benefits
of serving the huge European market could not justify the costs of
compliance or the risks of non-compliance. And surely many smaller
organizations disregard GDPR requirements because their exposure
to Europe is minor.
Nonetheless, when the GDPR went into effect in May 2018, people
across the world, including Americans, begin receiving a fusillade of
messages from companies updating their privacy policies. Some companies have adopted the compliance infrastructure required in the
GDPR—designating data protection officers, running impact assessments, baking in some form of privacy by design—throughout their
international operations. Just as the scholarship on the Brussels Effect
anticipates, these companies have found it desirable to maintain a unified firm-wide compliance architecture and adhered to the more
203. Id. (illustrating negotiations between the EU and external countries to allow
personal data to flow freely between economies).
204. Rebecca Sentance, GDPR: Which Websites Are Blocking Visitors from the EU?,
ECONSULTANCY (May 31, 2018), https://econsultancy.com/gdpr-which-websites-are
-blocking-visitors-from-the-eu-2 [https://perma.cc/9A2Y-XEHA].
205. Alex Hern & Martin Belam, LA Times Among US-Based News Sites Blocking EU
Users due to GDPR, GUARDIAN (May 25, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2018/may/25/gdpr-us-based-news-websites-eu-internet-users-la-times
[https://perma.cc/76J5-5G2C] (noting that U.S. papers such as the New York Daily
News, the Baltimore Sun, Orlando Sentinel, and the San Diego Union-Tribune also disabled access).
206. Alex Hern & Jim Waterson, Sites Block Users, Shutdown Activities and Flood
Inboxes as GDPR Rules Loom, GUARDIAN (May 24, 2018), www.theguardian.com/
technology/2018/may/24/sites-block-eu-users-before-gdpr-takes-effect [https://
perma.cc/4FYJ-PL5S].
207. Id.
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stringent GDPR requirements. A few companies have gone even further by adopting aspects of the GDPR other than its compliance rules;
Microsoft, for example, announced that it would “extend the rights
that are at the heart of GDPR to all of our consumer customers worldwide.”208
Through both the Directive and the GDPR, EU authorities successfully exported their approach to data protection to many places
around the globe, both through national responses to the adequacy
mechanism and institutional efforts to unify data compliance operations. But the influence of EU privacy law has been much more limited
in other respects, starting with its capacity to catalyze legal change in
the United States.
B. BUT SEE THE UNITED STATES
While the GDPR’s adequacy mechanism and its direct effect on
global companies may entice other jurisdictions worldwide to enact
or amend data privacy law, it is not the catalyst for recently proposed
laws in the United States. Indeed, as Part II shows, the CCPA is not
modeled on the GDPR, though both share similarities founded in the
long-established Fair Information Practice Principles. The forces behind both the CCPA and its counterparts across the United States do
not seek an adequacy ruling from the European Union. Nearly a quarter century of European data protection law did not prompt the United
States to take up a broad law of its own.
Why has the United States gone its own way? We will note later
that the exceptional American approach to free expression, and its
tension with some portions of the GDPR framework, are likely inhibiting factors. But we believe that an earlier moment of norm entrepreneurship was equally critical.
The EU prohibition on cross-border data transfers became effective in 1998 under the Data Protection Directive. Faced with the near
certainty that U.S. law would not be found adequate for unrestricted
data flow from the European Union,209 the Clinton administration set
208. Julie Brill, Microsoft’s Commitment to GDPR, Privacy and Putting Customers in
Control of Their Own Data, MICROSOFT BLOG (May 21, 2018), https://blogs.microsoft
.com/on-the-issues/2018/05/21/microsofts-commitment-to-gdpr-privacy-and
-putting-customers-in-control-of-their-own-data [https://perma.cc/2MG5-AJ49].
209. An adequacy determination would not have been forthcoming from the EU
without dramatic legal and regulatory changes in the U.S. See Opinion 1/99 of the Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data:
Concerning the Level of Data Protection in the United States and the Ongoing Discussions
Between the European Commission and the United States Government, at 2, art. 29 (Jan.
26, 1999), https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion
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out to negotiate an exception because U.S. companies wanted to avoid
using the more cumbersome mechanisms for data transfer available
under the European law. Bolstered by its close relationship to Europe
as well as America’s economic and other soft power, the Clinton administration worked out a bespoke exemption from the European
rules. American and European diplomats worked for years to negotiate a separate data trade agreement applicable only to their bilateral
relationship. In 2000, the Clinton administration and the European
Commission signed the “U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Agreement,” which allowed U.S. companies to certify annually that they adhered to a narrow set of general data protection principles in order to transfer personal data from the EU.210
The U.S. thus inoculated itself against any catalyzing effect from
EU data protection law, of either the de facto or de jure variety. The
European Commission (effectively the EU’s executive branch) ratified
the Safe Harbor as consistent with EU data protection law.211 But in a
2015 decision, the Court of Justice of the European Union, citing the
revelations of Edward Snowden about the scope of U.S. national security surveillance, struck down the Safe Harbor.212
Even then, the response was not for the U.S. to conform its law to
the EU adequacy standard, or even to concede that American data controllers would need to use one of the other mechanisms for crossborder data transfers. Instead, the two sides returned to the negotiating table and reached a new compromise, known as the “EU-U.S.
Privacy Shield.”213 The carrot of adequacy that enticed countries from
Argentina to Thailand to change their data privacy laws still failed to

-recommendation/files/1999/wp15_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/NR47-MKFU] (“[T]he
current patchwork of narrowly-focussed sectoral laws and voluntary self-regulation
cannot at present be relied upon to provide adequate protection in all cases for personal data transferred from the European Union.”). But see Christopher Wolf, Delusions
of Adequacy? Examining the Case for Finding the United States Adequate for Cross-Border EU-U.S. Data Transfers, 43 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 227 (2014) (making an admittedly
contrarian argument that U.S. law could be judged adequate under the Data Protection
Directive).
210. See Welcome to the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor, EXPORT.GOV (Jan. 12, 2017), https://
2016.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018365.asp [https://perma.cc/EKJ6
-XFHY].
211. See Commission Decision 2000/520, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7.
212. Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650 (Oct. 6,
2015).
213. See Privacy Shield Overview, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., https://www.privacyshield
.gov/Program-Overview [https://perma.cc/TA5G-KRVU].
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move U.S. privacy law.214 In 2020, the EU’s highest court once again
invalidated the special transatlantic arrangement as still inconsistent
with EU law.215 It remains to be seen how the EU and U.S. will respond
this time. But there is little indication that American jurisdictions have
become any more inclined to harmonize U.S. law with the GDPR
model.
We now turn to examine the recent extensive state and federal
legislative activity in the United States. Our close comparison of the
GDPR and the CCPA in Part I and our examination below of various
state and federal privacy bills shows that the CCPA, not the GDPR, has
played the leading role in the legislative response across the United
States. The various state bills are often modeled on provisions of the
CCPA. Federal bills in turn are the political response to state legislative
activity prompted by the CCPA.
1. State Laws
Since the advent of the GDPR and the CCPA, the United States has
seen an unprecedented volume of legislative proposals that would
regulate data privacy at the state level. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, in 2019 alone, consumer privacy bills
were introduced or filed in at least twenty-five states and Puerto
Rico.216 Legislatures in nearly half of the states (twenty-one by our
count) considered or enacted data security bills in 2018 and 2019.217
214. In a rare exception to this rule, as part of the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Privacy Shield, the U.S. Congress passed the Judicial Redress Act in 2015, 5
U.S.C. § 552a, to help assure Europeans that they would have the ability to bring claims
under the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, against U.S. governmental intrusions.
215. Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’n v. Facebook Ir. Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2019:1145
(Dec. 19, 2019).
216. 2019 Consumer Data Privacy Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 3,
2020), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information
-technology/consumer-data-privacy/calif.aspx [https://perma.cc/6WNL-RX4P].
217. See, e.g., Alabama Data Breach Notification Act of 2018, ALA. CODE § 8-38-1
(2018); Act Amending Title 44, Chapter 11, Arizona Revised Statutes, by Adding Article
2 Relating to Consumer Household Goods, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1611 to -1616
(2019); California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1789.175 (West
2019); Act Concerning Strengthening Protections for Consumer Data Privacy, COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-1-713, 6-1-716 (West 2019); S. 240, 101st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Ill. 2019) (introduced as Consumer Credit Reporting Agency Registration and
Cybersecurity Program Act); Act To Amend and Reenact R.S. 51:3073(2) and (4)(a)
and 3074, Relative to the Database Security Breach Notification Law, LA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 51:3073 to :3074 (2019) (requiring organizations to destroy information and expands definition of PII); S. 786, 439th Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2019); H.R. 904, 2019 Gen.
Assemb., 2019 Sess. (N.C. 2019); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 87-801, 87-806 (West 2019);
S. 176, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2019); S. 5575, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (N.Y.
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Data privacy and data security are related but not identical issues,218
although legislators frequently conflate them—evidenced by Colorado’s “data privacy” law, which focuses on data security matters. At
least ten states considered privacy laws aimed at Internet service providers (ISPs), presumably in response to Congress’s 2017 repeal of the
Federal Communications Commission’s broadband privacy rules.219
And legislators in many states proposed narrower privacy laws, on
topics from student privacy to the protection of biometric or geolocation information.220
2019); Security Breach Notification Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 162–166 (West
2008); Act Relating to Actions After a Breach of Security that Involves Personal Information, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 646A.602, .604, .606, .608, .610, .622 (West 2011); H.R.
1181, 2019–20 Gen. Assemb., 2019 Sess. (Pa. 2019); Insurance Data Security Act, S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 38-99-10 to -100 (2019); Act To Provide for the Notification Related to a
Breach of Certain Data and To Provide a Penalty Therefor, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 2240-19 to -26 (2019); Act To Amend Tennessee Code Annotated, Title 47, Relative to
Release of Personal Information, TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2107 (West 2019); Act Relating to the Privacy of Personal Identifying Information and the Creation of the Texas
Privacy Protection Advisory Council, H.R. 4390, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019); S.
156, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb., 2018 Sess. (Vt. 2018); H.R. 1071, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg.
Sess. (Wash. 2019); Act To Amend the Code of Virginia by Adding a Section Numbered
58.1-341.2, Relating to Notification of Tax Return Data Breach, VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1341.2 (2018). Virginia also introduced a bill in 2018 to amend and reenact section
59.1-200 related to the Virginia Consumer Protection Act. The bill died in committee.
H.D. 1588, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018).
218. See Derek E. Bambauer, Privacy Versus Security, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
667, 668–69 (2013) (“While legal scholars tend to conflate privacy and security, they
are distinct concerns.”); William McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security, 103 MINN. L.
REV. 1135, 1141 (2019) (“Data security is just one element of the broader concept of
data privacy; the latter also relates to the collection, use, and disclosure or personal
data in addition to its secure storage.”).
219. Brian Fung, Trump Has Signed Repeal of the FCC Privacy Rules. Here’s What
Happens Next., WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2017, 6:42 AM), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/04/04/trump-has-signed-repeal-of-the-fcc
-privacy-rules-heres-what-happens-next [https://perma.cc/RK25-UD2A]; see H.R.
230, 30th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ala. 2017); H.R. 232, 30th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ala. 2017); H.R. 277,
30th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ala. 2018); S. 160, 30th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ala. 2018) (these four Alaska
bills died); H.R. 80, 29th Leg., 2018 Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2018) (introducing a task force on
ISP privacy); S. 243, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2019); S. 275, 129th Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Me. 2019); H.D. 1655, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018); H.D. 141,
2020 Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2020); H.R. 382, 191st Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass.
2019); H.R. 1030, 91st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2019); S. 1553, 90th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Minn. 2018); H.R. 457, 66th Leg., 2019 Sess. (Mont. 2019) (failed in committee); S.
2641, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018); Gen. Assemb. 3711, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J.
2018); Gen. Assemb. 1927, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018); Gen. Assemb. 1527, 218th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018); S. 5245, 242d Leg., 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); H.R.
246, 2019–20 Gen. Assemb., 2019 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019).
220. See, e.g., H.R. 2354, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2018); Geolocation
Privacy Protection Act, H.R. 2785, 101st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2019); H.R.
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Our focus here is on the unprecedented flurry of comprehensive
data privacy legislation. Restricting the focus to comprehensive data
privacy laws, we count at least seventeen states in addition to California and Puerto Rico that considered or enacted comprehensive data
privacy laws in 2018 and 2019.221 Five states established task forces
with the goal of proposing data privacy legislation.222 Including task
forces, there were in 2018 and 2019 at least nineteen states (and
Puerto Rico) considering or enacting comprehensive data privacy legislation.223 In California, the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA), enacted via ballot initiative in November 2020 but with most provisions
not going into effect until January 2023, establishes the new California
Privacy Protection Agency, a privacy-specific regulator in that state.224
In addition to these individual state proposals, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) is developing a proposed uniform law that would establish “a comprehensive legal framework for the treatment of data
privacy,” guided to a large degree by the scope of the CCPA.225 The ULC
536-FN, 2019 Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2019) (adding biometric information to the consumer protection act); H.R. 2866, 80th Legis. Assemb., 2019 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019) (adding geolocation info); H.R. 352, 111st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2019) (making
unauthorized use or distribution of personal health information a violation of consumer protection law); S. 110, 2019–2020 Gen. Assemb., 2020 Sess. (Vt. 2020) (student privacy law); H.D. 2535, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2019) (requiring sites
to let minors request to remove information).
221. See S. 418, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2019); H.R. 3358, 101st Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2019); H.R. 465, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2019); S. 275, 129th Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Me. 2019); H.D. 901, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2019); S. 120, 191st
Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2019); H.R. 2917, 91st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2019); H.R. 592,
100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2019); S. 220, 80th Sess., Reg. Sess. (Nev.
2019, codified at Chap. 211); Gen. Assemb. 4640, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018); Gen.
Assemb. 4902, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J 2019); S. 176, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2019);
Assemb. 7736, 2019–2020 Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); S. 5642, 2019–2020 Leg.
Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); H.R. 1049, 2019–2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019);
H.R. 5930, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2019); H.R. 4518, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Tex. 2019); H.R. 764, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018); S. 5376, 66th
Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019).
222. S. 1108, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2019); H.R. 225, 30th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Haw. 2019); H.R. 249, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2019); H.R. 1485, 66th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2019); H.R. 4390, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019) (establishing
the Texas Privacy Protection Advisory Council).
223. North Dakota and Connecticut are each counted once in our analysis, as both
states proposed comprehensive data privacy legislation and ultimately instead established a task force.
224. See de la Torre & Brown, supra note 169.
225. Katie Robinson, New Drafting and Study Committees To Be Appointed, UNIF. L.
COMM’N (July 24, 2019, 4:37 PM), https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/
community-home/digestviewer/viewthread?MessageKey=bc3e157b-399e-4490
-9c5c-608ec5caabcc&CommunityKey=d4b8f588-4c2f-4db1-90e9-48b1184ca39a&
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has drafted and promoted hundreds of model statutes, from the Uniform Commercial Code to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Once the ULC
votes to publish model bills, it is up to individual state legislatures to
adopt them.226
We focus here on a few of these proposals to identify their intellectual origins in either the CCPA or the GDPR. We find that, despite
popular claims to the contrary, the catalysis for data privacy proposals
in state legislatures is emanating not from Brussels, but from California.
Take, for example, Connecticut’s proposed comprehensive data
privacy bill, SB 1108. The original version of the bill, introduced in January 2019, effectively copied the CCPA, with minor edits. The definition of “personal information” was identical; the definition of a covered “business” was identical.227 Like the CCPA, the proposed
Connecticut bill granted individuals access rights,228 a right to deletion,229 and a right to opt out of the sale of one’s data.230 Like the CCPA,
the proposed Connecticut bill prohibited businesses from discriminating against consumers for exercising their rights.231 The proposed bill
so closely tracked the CCPA’s requirements that it, too, required a tollfree number for requesting access, and a conspicuous “Do Not Sell My
Personal Information” link for opting out of sale.232 Ultimately, however, legislators replaced the bill with a substitute act establishing a
task force concerning consumer privacy, signed into law on July 9,
2019.233 The Act instructs the task force to “examine what information
businesses in this state should be required to disclose to
tab=digestviewer#bmbc3e157b-399e-4490-9c5c-608ec5caabcc [https://perma.cc/
98JG-TQQ3].
226. See FAQs, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/faq
[https://perma.cc/8XGL-CALF]. One of the authors of this Article, William McGeveran,
previously served as the reporter for the committee drafting this model legislation;
another of the authors of this Article, Margot Kaminski, serves as research director for
the Developments in Privacy Law Committee.
227. Compare California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1798.140(c) (defining “business”), and id. § 1798.140(o) (defining “personal information”), with S. 1108 § 1(3), 2019 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2019) (defining
“business”), and id. § 1(15) (defining “personal information”).
228. Conn. S. 1108 §§ 2, 4, 6.
229. Id. § 3.
230. Id. § 7.
231. Id. § 8.
232. Id. §§ 9(1), 10(1).
233. See generally Substitute for Raised S.B. No. 1108 Session Year 2019, CONN. GEN.
ASSEMB.,
https://www.cga.ct.gov/asp/cgabillstatus/cgabillstatus.asp?selBillType=
Bill&which_year=2019&bill_num=Sb+1108 [https://perma.cc/A6F7-NZF2].
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consumers . . . [s]uch examination shall include, but not be limited to,
the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, as amended, to consider
what provisions could be implemented in this state.”234
Massachusetts’s proposed data privacy bill, S. 120, provides another clear example of this mimicry.235 Also introduced in January
2019, S. 120 contains language identical to the California law in multiple places. Like the CCPA, the proposed Massachusetts bill applies to
“businesses,” and like the CCPA, this includes both businesses with
gross revenues over a certain threshold (ten million dollars in Massachusetts, twenty-five million dollars in California) and businesses that
derive fifty percent or more of annual revenue from the disclosure of
personal information. S. 120’s exception for publicly available information, too, almost perfectly adopts CCPA language.236 While S. 120
does not contain the CCPA’s exhaustive list of examples of personal
information, its core definition of personal information differs by just
one word.237 The proposed Massachusetts bill would establish notice,
access, and deletion requirements that largely correspond to those in
the CCPA.238 Like the CCPA, the rights are not waivable.239
In some places, the proposed Massachusetts bill is stronger than
the CCPA. It gives consumers the right to opt out of not just the sale of
personal information, but also of third-party disclosure.240 And unlike
the CCPA, it provides for a private right of action, with statutory
234. Substitute S. 1108 § 1(a), 2019 Gen. Assemb. (Conn. 2019).
235. Mark D. Quist, Comprehensive Data Privacy Legislation Introduced in Massachusetts – Includes Private Right of Action Without a Need To Prove Harm, MONDAQ (Feb.
15, 2019), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/781198/Data+Protection+
Privacy/Comprehensive+Data+Privacy+Legislation+Introduced+In+Massachusetts+
Includes+Private+Right+Of+Action+Without+A+Need+To+Prove+Harm [https://
perma.cc/CZ8S-QK2M].
236. Compare California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1798.140(o)(2) (2018), with S. 120 § 1(m)(1), 191st Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2019).
237. Compare Mass. S. 120 § 1(m)(1) (defining “personal information” as “information that identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated with, or could
reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or the consumer’s device” (emphasis added)), with CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(v)(1) (defining “personal information” as “information that identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably
capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly,
with a particular consumer or household” (emphasis added)).
238. Mass. S. 120 § 2 (requiring disclosure of categories of personal info, business
purpose, consumer rights, and more); id. § 3 (establishing the right to request specific
pieces of personal info, names of third parties to whom disclosed, sources, and business purpose); id. § 5 (covering the right to delete info collected from the consumer);
id. § 6 (including the right to opt out of third-party disclosure instead of sale).
239. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.192, with Mass. S. 120 § 14.
240. Mass. S. 120 § 6.
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damages of $750 per consumer per incident, plus attorney fees.241
Mirroring the CCPA, it directs the state attorney general to write regulations and empowers that office to enforce the new privacy rules.242
Also, in January 2019, North Dakota introduced data privacy legislation243 with significant similarities to the CCPA. That legislation
seems to have been inspired by a news report about European privacy
law that one of the drafters watched.244 Despite this inspiration, when
the time came to draft a bill, North Dakota also looked to California for
substantive language.245 The bill defined a covered business nearly
word-for-word identically to the CCPA’s definition.246 The definition
of “personal information,” too, closely tracked that in the CCPA.247 It
created a right of access similar to the CCPA’s.248 Unlike the CCPA,
however, in a few provisions, the North Dakota bill emulated a more
241. Id. § 9.
242. Id. §§ 10–11.
243. H.R. 1485, 66th Leg. Assemb. (N.D. 2019).
244. See Sara Merken, States Follow EU, California in Push for Consumer Privacy
Laws (1), BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 6, 2019, 3:02 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
privacy-and-data-security/states-follow-eu-california-in-push-for-consumer-privacylaws-1 [https://perma.cc/8A8X-9MUW] (“North Dakota Rep. Jim Kasper (R) told
Bloomberg Law that he decided to introduce legislation after watching a ‘60 Minutes’
program about the new rights the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation provides to
EU citizens.”).
245. Id. (noting that some states have “largely follow[ed] the lead of California” in
drafting consumer privacy laws).
246. Compare N.D. H.R. 1485, § 51-37-01 (“[A] [c]overed entity . . . a. Has annual
gross revenues in excess of twenty-five million dollars; b. Annually buys, receives, sells,
or shares personal information of at least fifty thousand consumers, households, or
devices; or c. Derives at least fifty percent of its annual revenues from selling personal
information.”), with California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1798.140(c) (West 2018) (defining business as “[a] sole proprietorship, partnership,
limited liability company, corporation, association, or other legal entity that . . . (A) Has
annual gross revenues in excess of twenty-five million dollars . . . (B) Alone or in combination, annually buys, receives for the business’s commercial purposes, sells, or
shares for commercial purposes, alone or in combination, the personal information of
50,000 or more consumers, households, or devices. (C) Derives 50 percent or more of
its annual revenues from selling consumers’ personal information.”).
247. Compare N.D. H.R. 1485 § 51-37-01 (“‘Personal information’ means information that identifies, describes, or could reasonably be linked with a particular individual. The term does not include publicly available information lawfully made available to the general public from federal, state, or local government records.”), with
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West 2018)
(“‘Personal information’ means information that identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or
indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.”).
248. N.D. H.R. 1485 § 51-37-03 (providing that upon “request from an individual,
a covered entity shall disclose” the content of personal data that it possesses).
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European approach; for example, it would have prohibited disclosure
of personal information without express written consent (more of an
opt-in than an opt-out) and it would have created a private right of
action.249 On the other hand, other departures from the CCPA took it
further from the GDPR, because it lacked a notice requirement or a
right to deletion. Ultimately, the bill was replaced by a proposal for a
legislative study of data privacy laws.250
These three states are just a sampling of this dynamic. We find
proposals in at least seven other states that could similarly be characterized as CCPA clones to a large degree.251 Bills in Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, like those in Connecticut and Massachusetts, copied portions of the CCPA wholesale.252 One proposed Texas
bill largely tracked the CCPA as well.253 Texas ultimately enacted a different bill into law, the Texas Privacy Protection Act; while initially it
too was a broad data protection law, it was ultimately amended to create a council to report back on proposed statutory changes.254 In Illinois, the proposed Data Transparency and Privacy Act would apply
the CCPA definition of “businesses” and would grant consumers both
notice and access rights and a right to opt out of sale, although it
249. Id. § 51-37-02 (“Prohibition against disclosure of personal information except
upon written consent.”); id. § 51-37-05 (“If an individual’s personal information is purchased, received, sold, or shared by a covered entity in violation of this chapter, the
individual may bring a civil action in a court of this state . . . .”).
250. N.D. H.R. 1485; see also N.D. LEGIS. COUNCIL, DISCLOSURE OF CONSUMERS’
PERSONAL DATA—BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM (2019), https://www.legis.nd.gov/files/
resource/committee-memorandum/21.9058.01000.pdf [https://perma.cc/7U2L
-7BLV] (noting that “House Bill No. 1485 was amended to provide for a mandatory
Legislative Management study on protections, enforcements, and remedies regarding
the disclosure of consumers’ personal data, and both chambers passed the bill as a
mandatory study”).
251. See Rachel R. Marmor, Maryam Casbarro, Monder “Mike” Khoury & Nancy Libin, “Copycat CCPA” Bills Introduced in States Across Country, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAIN
LLP (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.dwt.com/blogs/privacy—security-law-blog/2019/
02/copycat-ccpa-bills-introduced-in-states-across-cou [https://perma.cc/E6NB
-XAFU] (“Legislators in nine states have introduced draft bills that would impose broad
obligations on businesses to provide consumers with transparency and control of personal data.”).
252. H.R. 1253, 2019 Leg. (Miss. 2019); H.R. 1049, 2019 Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2019);
H.R. 5930, 2019 Gen. Assemb. (R.I. 2019).
253. H.R. 4518, 86th Leg. (Tex. 2019). By contrast, H.R. 4390, 86th Leg. (Tex. 2019)
takes a more blended CCPA-GDPR approach.
254. Tex. H.R. 4390; see Emily Bruemmer, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, State and
Federal Privacy Legislation Stalls, JD SUPRA (June 28, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/state-and-federal-privacy-legislation-63216
[https://perma.cc/D2GZ
-5P9H] (noting that House Bill 4390 created an advisory council to study data privacy
laws in Texas and other jurisdictions).
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carved out the use of data for advertising and other exemptions.255
Maryland’s bill and Hawaii’s original bill (later replaced with a task
force) offered a set of rights for data subjects similar to the CCPA,
though they differ in some significant respects.256
Nevada is one of the only states to not just consider but actually
enact new data privacy law in this period. The new law, expanding on
previously existing protections, went into effect in 2019.257 Nevada
law had already required websites and online services that collect certain personal information to provide notice to consumers.258 While
not directly importing language from the CCPA, the new Nevada law
echoes the conceptual core of the CCPA by prohibiting companies
from selling consumer information on receipt of a “verified request”
from the consumer to opt out.259 That said, the new Nevada law proves
considerably less ambitious in scope than the CCPA: it covers a narrower definition of personal information, and a narrower subset of
businesses, and requires less of them (no access requests, no deletion).260 It also defines “sale” less broadly than does the CCPA.261 But
its focus on an opt-out for restricting sale of personal data is distinctly
Californian, and not European.262
In summary: a considerable number of states are mimicking the
precise language of the CCPA, while others are adopting its core consumer-oriented framework. No state has proposed adopting European-style comprehensive data protection law. We found very few
state proposals that even focused on GDPR-like compliance obligations in addition to individual consumer rights, including Washington’s recently failed Privacy Act263 (discussed further below) and one
of the two bills proposed in Texas.264 One of New York’s proposals reflects a third competing concept of data privacy, which we introduce
and discuss in the next Section.265 But our close analysis clearly shows
255. H.R. 3358, 101st Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2019).
256. S. 418, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2019); S. 613, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Md. 2019); see also Marmor et al., supra note 251 (describing the differences between
the states’ draft laws).
257. S. 220, 80th Sess. (Nev. 2019).
258. NEV. REV. STAT. § 603A.340 (2019).
259. Nev. S. 220, § 2.2 (codified at NEV. REV. STAT. § 603A.345).
260. Nev. S. 220.
261. Id. § 1.6.1.
262. Id. § 2.2.
263. Washington Privacy Act, S. 5376, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019).
264. H.R. 4390, 86th Leg. (Tex. 2019).
265. S. 5642, 2019–2020 Leg. Sess, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); see Issie Lapowsky, New
York’s Privacy Bill Is Even Bolder Than California’s, WIRED (June 4, 2019),
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that California, not Europe, is catalyzing comprehensive data privacy
legislation in states around the country.
2. Federal Laws
While state bills are typically modeled on the CCPA, many proposed federal privacy bills may not look much like the CCPA at all. Yet,
we argue, they are clearly drafted in response to it. There were by our
count at least ten federal data privacy proposals introduced in 2018
and 2019.266 New federal bills continue to be introduced all the
time.267 We compare several of these proposed federal laws to show
how they differ from both the GDPR and the CCPA—and note how a
third model has also emerged. We close this Section by explaining
why, nonetheless, the CCPA can be understood as the primary catalyst
of federal data privacy proposals.
We compare below the following proposed legislation to the
CCPA and GDPR: Senator Ron Wyden’s Consumer Data Protection
Act,268 Senator Marco Rubio’s American Data Dissemination Act,269
and Senator Brian Schatz’s Data Care Act.270 We conclude that the substantive provisions of several of the bills draw from older privacy laws
or from academic proposals, not the GDPR or the CCPA. At least among

https://www.wired.com/story/new-york-privacy-act-bolder [https://perma.cc/
HMH4-EEGM] (describing the New York Privacy Act).
266. See supra note 6 (listing comprehensive privacy bills currently being considered in Congress). See generally Cameron F. Kerry, Breaking Down Proposals for Privacy
Legislation: How Do They Regulate?, BROOKINGS (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.brookings
.edu/research/breaking-down-proposals-for-privacy-legislation-how-do-they
-regulate [https://perma.cc/2XML-YBRU] (discussing how different data privacy proposals may interact with existing regulatory framework); Tim Peterson, Circling Closer
to a Federal Privacy Law, Congress Has Introduced 7 Privacy Bills This Year, DIGIDAY
(June 25, 2019), https://digiday.com/marketing/cheatsheet-know-7-privacy-bills
-congress-introduced-year [https://perma.cc/GC3V-ERD6] (describing different federal data privacy proposals).
267. See, e.g., Zack Whittaker, A New Senate Bill Would Create a U.S. Data Protection
Agency, TECH CRUNCH (Feb. 13, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/02/13/
gilliband-law-data-agency [https://perma.cc/9568-6NNH] (discussing a new bill proposed by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand called the Data Protection Act); Geoffrey A. Fowler,
Nobody Reads Privacy Policies. This Senator Wants Lawmakers To Stop Pretending We
Do, WASH. POST (June 18, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2020/06/18/data-privacy-law-sherrod-brown [https://perma.cc/87D2
-7LMW] (discussing a new bill proposed by Senator Sherrod Brown called the Data
Accountability and Transparency Act).
268. S. SIL18B29, 115th Cong. (2018).
269. S. 142, 115th Cong. (2019).
270. S. 3744, 115th Cong. (2018).

1778

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:1733

the bills analyzed here, only Senator Wyden’s bill shows direct signs
of influence from both the CCPA and GDPR.
The proposed Consumer Data Privacy Act (CDPA),271 introduced
by Senator Wyden in November 2018, incorporates language and concepts from both the CCPA and GDPR, yet differs from both. For example, like the CCPA, the CDPA’s definition of personal information focuses on whether information is not just individually identified but
“reasonably linkable” to an individual.272 Like the CCPA, the CDPA
does not cover businesses below a certain size, as long as they meet
other restrictions.273 The CDPA, however, would incorporate a number of aspects of the GDPR: it would require reporting in some circumstances;274 create access rights,275 including with respect to companies that lack a direct relationship with consumers;276 create a right of
correction;277 and require impact assessments for automated decision-making.278 Unlike either the GDPR or CCPA, however, the CDPA
would build enforcement around a robust consumer right to opt out
of data sharing with third parties.279 The CDPA directs the FTC to
promulgate regulations, and houses enforcement with the FTC, to
which it allocates considerable additional resources.280 It does not
preempt state regulation.
The proposed Data Care Act (DCA) introduced in December 2018
by Senator Schatz with fourteen cosponsors, differs fundamentally

271. S. SIL18B29, 115th Cong. (2018).
272. Compare id. § 2.12 (defining “personal information” as “any information, regardless of how the information is collected, inferred, or obtained that is reasonably
linkable to a specific consumer or consumer device”), with California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West 2018) (defining “personal information” as “information that identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable
of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a
particular consumer or household”).
273. Compare S. SIL18B29, 115th Cong. § 2.5(B)(i) (2018) (excluding companies
with less than fifty million dollars in average annual gross receipts and requiring that
they not collect information on over one million people and devices and are not data
brokers), with CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(1)(A) (2018) (excluding companies with less
than twenty-five million dollars in annual gross revenues).
274. S. SIL18B29, 115th Cong. § 5 (2018).
275. Id. § 7(b)(1)(D).
276. Id. § 7(b)(1)(D)(iii); see GDPR, supra note 7, art. 14 (“Information to be provided where personal data have not been obtained from the data subject”).
277. S. SIL18B29 § 7(b)(1)(F).
278. Id. § 7(b)(1)(G).
279. Id. § 7(b)(1)(D)(iii).
280. See generally id.
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from both the CCPA and GDPR.281 The DCA would impose duties of
care, loyalty, and confidentiality on online service providers.282 The
DCA focuses on duties owed by companies with a direct relationship
to consumers, not on data brokers or other third parties.283 Thus, the
DCA advances a consumer protection rather than data protection
model of privacy and does not impose any of the transparency requirements that are central to both the California and EU regimes. The
DCA embodies an emerging strain of thought about privacy among
U.S. scholars who advocate redefining privacy as a matter of “trust” or
“fiduciary-like duty” on the part of large-scale data collectors.284 The
“information fiduciary” model of data privacy has not been limited to
Senator Schatz’s federal proposal; the recent New York Privacy Act
was modeled on the concept.285 This shows the possibility of a third
potential catalyst on the field—the concept of an “information fiduciary,” stemming from a number of academic proposals—and indicates
perhaps an upcoming battle of the norm entrepreneurs, discussed further below.
281. Data Care Act of 2018 (DCA), S. 3744, 115th Cong. (2018). The DCA would put
enforcement in the hands of the FTC, already responsible for enforcing aspects of U.S.
data privacy under its consumer protection authority. Id. § 4(a). The Act would not
preempt state privacy laws, although state attorneys general would be prevented from
bringing enforcement actions during an FTC enforcement action. Id. § 5.
282. Id. § 3.
283. Id.
284. See ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN
INFORMATION AGE (2018) (advocating for a data privacy model based upon a context of
trust); Balkin, supra note 137, at 1186 (discussing “the concept of an information fiduciary”); Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Information Fiduciaries, 42 SEATTLE L. REV. 1057, 1087–106 (2019) (arguing that fiduciary
duties should be applied to data collectors); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap: A Review, 126 YALE L.J. 1180, 1219–23 (2017) (reviewing FINN
BRUNTON & HELEN NISSENBAUM, OBFUSCATION: A USER’S GUIDE FOR PRIVACY AND PROTEST
(2015), and discussing how to promote trust in a digital world and hold data collectors
responsible); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law,
19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 434 (2016) (“If we want a sustainable digital society, we
need strong, trusted information relationships [between consumers and data collectors].”); Tim Wu, An American Alternative to Europe’s Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 30,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/30/opinion/europe-america-privacy
-gdpr.html [https://perma.cc/49ZK-87WG] (“[T]he United States may need to . . . rely
on judges and state law to establish that the legal concept of ‘fiduciary duty’ can apply
to technology companies.”). For a critique, see Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 497 (2019), which identifies issues with the theory of information fiduciaries.
285. S. 5642, 2019–2020 Leg. Sess, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); see Bruemmer et al., supra note 254 (“[T]he New York Privacy Act included the concept of a ‘data fiduciary’. . . .”); Lapowsky, supra note 265 (“[T]he New York bill would . . . require businesses to act as so-called ‘data fiduciaries’ . . . .”).
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The proposed American Data Dissemination Act (ADD), introduced by Senator Rubio in January 2019, directs the FTC to propose
privacy rules “substantially similar, to the extent practicable, to the
requirements applicable to agencies” under the 1974 Privacy Act.286
Unlike the Privacy Act,287 which applies only to the federal government, these rules would apply to private sector actors that collect certain types of personal information.288 The ADD resembles the GDPR
and CCPA only to the extent that those two regimes, like the 1974 Privacy Act, build on Fair Information Practice Principles.289 It directs the
FTC to adopt regulations that restrict disclosures of records;290 create
an access right;291 and create a correction right of sorts, or at least a
means to amend and dispute inaccurate records based on process established under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.292 Thus, the ADD draws
on neither the CCPA nor the GDPR directly, but instead uses existing
federal privacy law as its model. The ADD would preempt state privacy laws.293
While the three federal bills do not mimic the CCPA to the extent
state laws do, the CCPA laid the groundwork for federal legislation in
two key ways. First, because U.S. corporations with national reach will
likely find themselves having to comply with the CCPA (and possibly
also the GDPR), a federal rule presents less of a regulatory burden for
U.S. corporations than it would have in the absence of the CCPA. Second, many hope to limit the potential regulatory burden of multiple,
varying state laws by enacting a federal law that preempts state laws.
Given the flurry of activity in state houses across the country, a federal
law seems to many businesses like the “least worst” option. In this
sense, the federal response may well be a backlash against the CCPA
rather than an embrace of it.

286. American Data Dissemination Act of 2019, S. 142, 115th Cong. § 4(a)(2)
(2019).
287. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
288. S. 142, 115th Cong. § 2(a)(5) (2019) (defining “covered providers”).
289. Fair Information Practice Principles, INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS., https://iapp.org/
resources/article/fair-information-practices/#:~:text=(1)%20The%20Collection%
20Limitation%20Principle,2)%20The%20Data%20Quality%20Principle [https://
perma.cc/EY8C-92GD] (describing the eight principles).
290. American Data Dissemination Act of 2019, S. 142, 115th Cong. § 4(b)(1)(B)
(2019).
291. Id. § 4(b)(1)(C).
292. Id. § 4(b)(1)(D)–(E).
293. Id. § 6.
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C. CALIFORNIA AS U.S. PRIVACY CATALYST
The above analysis—in Part II comparing the CCPA and GDPR,
and in this Part above analyzing in detail a number of recent state and
federal proposals—leads us to a new understanding of what is happening in the race to influence U.S. data privacy law. The true story is
more complex, and more interesting, than the conventional narrative
of a long-armed, unilateral Brussels. California, not Europe, has been
catalyzing privacy proposals across the United States.
In this Section, we offer this alternative story. We begin with a
discussion of how our departure from the GDPR-centric narrative is
more than just a shift in location from Brussels to Sacramento. The
story of California as the U.S. data privacy catalyst involves not just
state government actors but also tightly networked norm entrepreneurs, acting against backdrop forces of what we call “data globalization.” The spread of the CCPA to other states, we posit, reflects a number of overlapping dynamics, and the influence of the GDPR is only one
of them. This version of the story may be messier than a pure Brussels
Effect, but it is more accurate and leads to several insights about the
near future of U.S. data privacy law.
The theories of regulatory catalysis that we discussed in Part I are
essentially realist or rational choice theories of lawmaking. That is, the
Brussels Effect largely conceives of States (and states) as unitary actors, using power to achieve compliance on an international stage or
balancing sticks with carrots to drive both government and private
entities towards rationally choosing a regulatory goal.
The story of the CCPA, when examined in greater detail, is far
more complex. It is not the story of California as a unified state actor
but of a collection of individual norm entrepreneurs that harnessed
the state legislative process to produce the law. In this sense, it is a
legal process story made up not just of governments but of individuals, issue networks, and interpretative communities, one that reflects
Harold Koh’s characterization of vertical legal process in style if not in
transnational nature.294
If the origin story of the CCPA teaches anything, it is that individuals and networks of individuals play significant roles in the process
of regulatory catalysis. Before 2018, California, like every other U.S.
294. See generally Koh, supra note 192, at 1406 (explaining compliance with international law norms in part through “the vertical process whereby transnational actors
interact in various fora, generate and interpret international norms, and then seek to
internalize those norms domestically”); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996) (providing a broad overview of transnational legal process and its significance in international legal scholarship).
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state and the federal government, had no comprehensive data privacy
law. Real estate developer Alastair Mactaggart wanted to enact such
law in California.295 Mactaggart and his friend Rick Arney, who had
worked in the California legislature, knew they could use California’s
referendum process to avoid being tangled up by lobbying in the legislature.296 Mactaggart befriended Mary Stone Ross, who had worked
for the CIA and the House Intelligence Committee.297 They collaborated on drafting the ballot initiative through a group they named Californians for Consumer Privacy, the political committee that then
pushed the bill (although Ross and Mactaggart later had a falling
out).298 Mactaggart looked up privacy experts, and contacted UC
Berkeley Professor Chris Jay Hoofnagle, who put him in touch with
former FTC Chief Technologist Ashkan Soltani.299 Mactaggart then
hired Soltani to help revise the proposed ballot initiative, the bones of
which became the CCPA.300 Then, as Soltani has put it, “Mactaggart . . .
offered Silicon Valley a take-it-or-leave-it privacy policy—the same
kind that Silicon Valley usually offered everyone else.”301
By using the California ballot initiative process, Mactaggart and
his allies forced the state legislature’s hand.302 The California legislature, fearing the practical difficulties of a ballot initiative that would
become nearly unchangeable law with immediate effect,303 scrambled

295. See Nicholas Confessore, The Unlikely Activists Who Took On Silicon Valley—
and Won, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/
magazine/facebook-google-privacy-data.html [https://perma.cc/PG7Y-A9FM].
296. Id.
297. Kashmir Hill, How a Woman Disappears from the History Books, JEZEBEL (Aug.
20, 2018), https://jezebel.com/how-a-woman-disappears-from-the-history-books
-1828393645 [https://perma.cc/J7C9-2CHP].
298. See id. (noting “personality conflicts” between Mactaggart and Ross).
299. Confessore, supra note 295.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. The initiative gathered some 629,000 signatures. Id.
303. Amending an initiative approved by the voters “would require a 70 percent
vote of each house and signature by the governor,” and any amendment would have to
be “consistent with, and further the intent of, the act.” Edward R. McNicholas, Colleen
Theresa Brown, Amy Lally, Michael Mallow & Ash Nagdev, California’s GDPR? Sweeping
California Privacy Ballot Initiative Could Bring Sea Change to U.S. Privacy Regulation and
Enforcement, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (June 26, 2018), https://datamatters.sidley.com/
californias-gdpr-sweeping-california-privacy-ballot-initiative-could-bring-sea-change
-to-u-s-privacy-regulation-and-enforcement [https://perma.cc/KZ9G-RNH2]; Kristen
J. Mathews & Courtney M. Bowman, The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018,
PROSKAUER ROSE LLP (July 13, 2018), https://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2018/07/
articles/data-privacy-laws/the-california-consumer-privacy-act-of-2018 [https://
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to draft a bill that would persuade the initiative’s sponsors to withdraw it.304 State Assembly member Ed Chau and State Senator Robert
Hertzberg, both from districts neighboring Los Angeles, introduced
the bill.305 The enactment of the CCPA does not represent the action of
a legislature that independently recognized a social problem it could
help address or a response spurred by companies advocating for legislation under the pressures of the GDPR. Instead, it was the legislature’s reaction to leverage exerted by highly motivated, connected,
and—at least in Mactaggart’s case—wealthy individuals.306
Rather than causing a race to the bottom, the backdrop of data
globalization appears to have both influenced and empowered these
norm entrepreneurs. First, news stories about the effects of data globalization enabled Mactaggart to frame the importance of the initiative,
as he repeatedly pointed to the story of the British consulting firm
Cambridge Analytica using U.S. persons’ data to allegedly manipulate
voters in the 2016 election.307 In the preamble to the CCPA, the California legislature eventually echoed this motivation.308 Second, data
perma.cc/8A87-JZJW] (“[I]t can be very difficult to amend [California] ballot initiatives
once they are voted into law.”).
304. See Confessore, supra note 295 (“[Mactaggart] . . . told California lawmakers
that he would drop his campaign if they could pass a reasonable privacy bill by June
28, the legal point of no return for formally withdrawing his initiative from the ballot.”); Assemb. 375, 2018 Leg. § 2(g) (Cal. 2018) (enacted) (“In March 2018, it came to
light that tens of millions of people had their personal data misused by a data mining
firm called Cambridge Analytica.”).
305. See Assemb. 375, 2018 Leg. § 2(g) (Cal. 2018) (enacted) (enacting the California Privacy Act of 2018).
306. To some extent, aspects of the GDPR reflect this dynamic, too. See Case C–
362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650 (Oct. 6, 2015) (invalidating the EU Safe Harbor arrangement in favor of privacy advocate Schrems).
307. Cambridge Analytica LLC, Docket No. 9383, 2019 WL 6724446 (FTC Nov. 25,
2019); see Casey Newton, How a Wiley Californian Beat Google and Facebook’s Influence
Operation, VERGE (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/15/1769
1004/california-data-privacy-law-alastair-mactaggart-regulation [https://perma.cc/
9CZY-WDKG] (“Mactaggart benefited from increased skepticism about tech companies
broadly, but he also got an unexpected gift this spring: the Cambridge Analytica data
privacy scandal.”). For an argument that the actual impact of the Cambridge Analytica
misuse of information on the 2016 U.S. election was “likely exaggerated,” see YOCHAI
BENKLER, ROBERT FARIS & HAL ROBERTS, NETWORK PROPAGANDA: MANIPULATION,
DISINFORMATION, AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 277 (2018).
308. Assemb. 375, 2018 Leg. § 2(g) (Cal. 2018) (“In March 2018, it came to light
that tens of millions of people had their personal data misused by a data mining firm
called Cambridge Analytica. A series of congressional hearings highlighted that our
personal information may be vulnerable to misuse when shared on the Internet. As a
result, our desire for privacy controls and transparency in data practices is heightened.”).
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globalization may have lowered some of the bigger hurdles to privacy
lawmaking in California (and possibly Congress) by imposing GDPR
compliance costs on the large Silicon Valley enterprises, almost all of
which have a substantial European presence. Faced with significant
privacy compliance costs from the GDPR, the marginal cost of a state
privacy statute to their business model was now much lower. Third,
data globalization enabled the GDPR itself to touch U.S. citizens in the
form of both updated privacy policies and news stories about protective European privacy law.309 This affected both public opinion and
elite responses, whether causing U.S. citizens to wonder why Europeans should get privacy protections that we do not, or inspiring lawmakers like the North Dakota legislator to take action on a privacy
bill.310
What happened next—the spread of the CCPA—was intended
and predicted by its originators, who hypothesized that, like California
emissions standards, a baseline data privacy law would spread.311 We
offer four explanations, beyond the usual dynamics of the California
Effect, as to why this is happening.
First, even prior to the CCPA, California established itself nationally as an expert jurisdiction on data privacy law, given both previous
pioneering legislation and the presence of Silicon Valley within its borders. California has been a forerunner in laws governing online data
privacy and data security for over fifteen years. The California Online
Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA) was enacted in 2003 and went into
effect in 2004.312 It was the first U.S. law “to require commercial

309. See, e.g., Adam Satariano, GDPR, a New Privacy Law, Makes Europe World’s
Leading Tech Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
05/24/technology/europe-gdpr-privacy.html (“[T]he European Union . . . enacts the
world’s toughest rules to protect people’s online data.”).
310. See, e.g., Brooke Auxer, Lee Rainie, Monica Anderson, Andrew Perrin, Madhu
Kumar & Erica Turner, Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling Lack of
Control over Their Personal Information, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www
.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concerned
-confused-and-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information [https://
perma.cc/QN3J-EX93] (“[A] majority of Americans report being concerned about the
way their data is being used by companies . . . .”).
311. Confessore, supra note 295 (noting how Mactaggart compares privacy legislation to auto-emission legislation).
312. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579 (West 2014).
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websites and online services to post a privacy policy.”313 In the intervening years, privacy policies have become ubiquitous across the Internet.314
Also, in 2003, California enacted a data breach notification law:
legal rules requiring companies that have suffered a qualifying data
security breach to notify users whose information may have been
compromised.315 Prior to California’s intervention, few companies
voluntarily disclosed security breaches of their customers’ personal
information, fearing the public relations disaster of such a revelation.316 At first, some companies limited their compliance with the
new data breach notification law to the borders of California. In 2004,
the data broker ChoicePoint suffered a huge data breach.317 Initially,
it reported that breach to Californians only, as the state’s law required.318 However, observers quickly noted how odd it would be if a
data breach at an Atlanta-based nationwide operation affected only
Californians. Faced with intense criticism for failing to inform customers outside California, ChoicePoint voluntarily issued a nationwide notice to all Americans whose information had been compromised.319
313. California Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA), CONSUMER FED’N CAL. EDUC.
FOUND. (July 29, 2015), https://consumercal.org/about-cfc/cfc-education-foundation/
california-online-privacy-protection-act-caloppa-3 [https://perma.cc/QL8G-499H].
314. See, e.g., supra note 208 and accompanying text.
315. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2003) (providing disclosure requirements for
any person or business in California who owns or licenses computerized data, including personal information, when there is a security breach of the system).
316. SAMUELSON L., TECH. & PUB. POL’Y CLINIC, UNIV. CAL.-BERKELEY SCH. L., SECURITY
BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS: VIEWS FROM CHIEF SECURITY OFFICERS 15 (2007), https://
www.law.berkeley.edu/files/cso_study.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BG7-8VDN] (conducting interviews with businesses and noting that “all the organizations interviewed
noted concerns that a public notification of a breach would damage their organizations’ reputation and the trust behind their name”).
317. Tom Zeller Jr., Breach Points Up Flaws in Privacy Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24,
2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/24/business/breach-points-up-flaws-in
-privacy-laws.html [https://perma.cc/G6MH-GWJW] (noting that the data breach allowed con artists to access “personal data of nearly 145,000 people”).
318. See id. (“ChoicePoint informed only 35,000 Californians that their information
might have been compromised in [breach] because California is currently the only
state that requires companies to make such disclosures.”).
319. ChoicePoint explained its delay in notifying non-Californians as follows: “The
company said it first notified consumers in California because that was where most of
the victims lived, and then prepared more notices when investigators suggested that
residents in nearly every state were affected.” Id. Most analysts discredit this explanation. See, e.g., Ronald I. Raether, Jr., There Has Been a Data Security Breach: But Is Notice
Required?, A.B.A. (Aug. 31, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/content/
2011/08/article-raether.shtml [https://perma.cc/E57W-NQLT] (“ChoicePoint decided initially to notify only California consumers. The backlash was swift and
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This notification also resulted in an enforcement action by the FTC.
ChoicePoint, a provider of credit reporting services, had violated the
federal Fair Credit Reporting Act by allowing access to some 163,000
consumer reports to persons who were not duly authorized to receive
access.320 So far, this story resonates with our account of the Brussels
Effect: a large business found it unwise to compartmentalize its compliance efforts based on the law of particular jurisdictions and was
forced to provide a higher level of protection across its operations.
By 2005, the California breach notification law had unleashed a
“wave” of additional reported security breaches in the state.321 These
notifications in California alerted consumers nationally of breaches
that might have affected them but remained unreported under their
own states’ laws. Very swiftly, in a textbook de jure California Effect,
dozens of other states adopted their own notification laws.322 Today,
all fifty states have enacted data security breach notification laws.323
The laws that followed California’s not only copied but also both expanded324 and contracted325 California’s model. And in 2018, the
immediate. ChoicePoint quickly modified its decision and notified all affected consumers regardless of their state of residency.”).
320. Natalie Kim, Three’s a Crowd: Towards Contextual Integrity in Third-Party
Data Sharing, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 325, 330 (2014); see Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J.
Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 923 (2007) (describing ChoicePoint’s settlement with the FTC). The FTC-ChoicePoint settlement also
authorized the FTC to monitor compliance by “[p]osing as consumers and suppliers”
of ChoicePoint. See Stipulated Final Judgement & Order at 19, United States v. ChoicePoint Inc., No. 1:06-cv-0198 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 26, 2006), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/cases/2006/01/0523069stip.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9N9
-3T9U].
321. Satish M. Kini & James T. Shreve, Notice Requirements: Common Themes and
Differences in the Regulatory and Legislative Responses to Data Security Breaches, 10
N.C. BANKING INST. 87, 87 (2006).
322. See SAMUELSON L., TECH. & PUB. POL’Y CLINIC, supra note 316, at 3 (“At least 36
states have enacted legislation requiring organizations that possess sensitive personal
information to warn individuals of security breaches. California led the way in the creation of these laws, driven by concerns about identity theft and lax information security. In following California’s lead, other states have expanded upon the requirements
of the California statute by, for example, requiring that organizations report breaches
to a state regulatory agency.”).
323. Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 17,
2020), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information
-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/3ZXZ-WA2C].
324. See SAMUELSON L., TECH. & PUB. POL’Y CLINIC, supra note 316, at 9 (“[M]any
states have expanded the definition to include various others forms of personal information . . . .”).
325. Id. at 44 (“[M]any states have also narrowed California’s notification trigger
by exempting notification to consumers only if, upon a reasonable investigation, the
organization reasonably determines that harm is not likely to result to individuals
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GDPR introduced security breach notification into European law, explicitly borrowing from California’s innovation.326
This history of following California law lays the groundwork for
states to imitate the CCPA. And California may be seen as an expert
jurisdiction on digital data policy for other reasons. If a state legislature is going to copy another state and wants to strike a balance between individual rights and business needs, California law represents
an appealingly pre-packaged compromise from the state that houses
both a generally pro-consumer electorate and Silicon Valley industry.
Second, we believe states may be copying California because they
presume that the CCPA will create a Brussels Effect of de facto compliance, originating in California. This is probably part of what caused the
copycat data breach notification statutes. Lawmakers in other states
should anticipate that companies are less likely to oppose a bill if it
tracks the contours of a California law that those businesses must
obey already. Even though the CCPA protects only California residents, companies may find it difficult to partition that data or may calculate the cost is low enough to extend their compliance infrastructure to consumers in other states. This makes those companies with
exposure to the CCPA, but not to the GDPR, less likely to fight a local
law that mimics the CCPA.
Third, compared to the GDPR, the CCPA is a better legal meme for
U.S. legislators.327 The GDPR contains 99 articles and 173 recitals, and
it harnesses an existing complex regulatory system against the backdrop of European court decisions and constitutional doctrine. The
GDPR is long, complicated, and foreign.328 The CCPA’s relative brevity
and simplicity, however, likely make it more appealing to state legislatures. A state could only “copy” the GDPR after condensing it and
transposing it into an American legal setting. A state can copy the
CCPA simply by cutting and pasting.
Fourth, while not directly catalyzing U.S. privacy law, the GDPR
continues to play an important role. For the most part the GDPR has
not had a (de jure) “California Effect” on the U.S. federal government
or U.S. states, but it has had a (de facto) “Brussels Effect” on companies
whose information is compromised by the breach. Vermont requires that, if an organization makes such a determination, the organization must provide notice and an explanation to the Attorney General or to the applicable department of banking, insurance, securities and health care administration.”).
326. See GDPR, supra note 7, art. 33 (“Notification of a personal data breach to the
supervisory authority.”).
327. We thank Christina Mulligan for this insightful characterization.
328. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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operating in U.S. jurisdictions. This may lower the resistance of global
companies to both state and U.S. data privacy law. While many of the
companies most affected by the GDPR were already shouldering regulatory costs under the prior Data Protection Directive, the GDPR has
heavier obligations, more explicit extraterritorial reach, and more severe penalties, all of which have dramatically increased corporate investment in GDPR compliance over the levels under the Directive.
A clear example of this dynamic is the proposed Washington Privacy Act, which has twice come relatively close to passage only to fail
late in the process.329 This bill had more similarities with the GDPR
than other state legislation.330 It used GDPR terminology such as “controller” and “processor.”331 It would have established “GDPR lite” requirements for notice, access, correction, deletion, and restriction of
processing requirements, and would have imported aspects of the EU
concept of lawful processing.332 Unlike other proposed state laws, the
Washington bill included privacy risk assessments, another idea borrowed from the GDPR.333 It even drew on the GDPR’s limitations on
automated decision-making.334
The key to understanding why the Washington proposal borrowed so many elements of the GDPR may be one of the state’s largest
companies: Microsoft.335 Microsoft has declared that it complies with

329. S. 5376, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019).
330. Id.
331. See generally id.; GDPR, supra note 7, art. 33 (using the terms “controller” and
“processor”).
332. Wash. S. 5376 § 7 (requiring controllers to provides consumers a privacy notice that includes: the categories of personal data collected, purposes for which that
data is used, rights that consumers may exercise, categories of personal data shared
with third parties, and whether it sells personal data to data brokers).
333. Compare id. § 8(4) (“The controller must make the risk assessment available
to the attorney general upon request. Risk assessments are confidential and exempt
from public inspection and copying.”), with GDPR, supra note 7, art. 35 ¶ 7 (“Data protection impact assessment.”).
334. Washington Privacy Act, H.R. 5376, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 6(7), (14)(1)
(Wash. 2019) (“A consumer must not be subject to a decision based solely on profiling
which produces legal effects concerning such consumer or similarly significantly affects the consumer . . . Controllers using facial recognition for profiling must employ
meaningful human review prior to making final decisions based on such profiling
where such final decisions produce legal effects concerning consumers or similarly significant effects concerning consumers.”).
335. Microsoft Corporation (MSFT), YAHOO FIN. (Jan. 17, 2021), https://finance
.yahoo.com/quote/MSFT/ [https://perma.cc/K68U-3STV] (showing Microsoft’s market capitalization as of January 17, 2021, as $1.608 trillion).
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the GDPR worldwide.336 With over 451,000 employees in the state, the
company has a significant voice in Washington.337 The company actively promoted adoption of the Washington statute; Microsoft President Brad Smith described it as “build[ing] on the best aspects of approaches elsewhere.”338 In introducing the bill, Washington Chief
Privacy Officer Alex Alben tellingly explained that “companies that already comply with Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation . . .
shouldn’t have a hard time complying with the proposed law in Washington.”339
The Brussels Effect on Microsoft may thus be driving it to push
for state privacy legislation that more closely maps on to the GDPR
and therefore does not raise regulatory costs for Microsoft—but may
raise regulatory costs for non-GDPR-compliant local competitors. Microsoft also gains by assuring users that their information is well-protected, with legal sanctions for failures.
After sailing through the state senate by a vote of 46-1,340 the
Washington bill foundered amid controversy in 2019. After portions
of the original legislation were stripped out, the state ACLU and

336. Julie Brill, Microsoft’s Commitment to GDPR, Privacy and Putting Customers in
Control of Their Own Data, MICROSOFT ON ISSUES (May 21, 2018), https://blogs
.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2018/05/21/microsofts-commitment-to-gdpr-privacy
-and-putting-customers-in-control-of-their-own-data [https://perma.cc/P5D2-TZZ8]
(“That’s why today we are announcing that we will extend the rights that are at the
heart of GDPR to all of our consumer customers worldwide. Known as Data Subject
Rights, they include the right to know what data we collect about you, to correct that
data, to delete it and even to take it somewhere else.”).
337. Monica Nickelsburg, Amazon Surpasses Microsoft in Number of Seattle Region
Employees Amid Big Growth Plans Across US, GEEKWIRE (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www
.geekwire.com/2019/amazon-surpasses-microsoft-number-seattle-region
-employees-amid-big-growth-plans-across-us [https://perma.cc/6RZT-AG7L].
338. Brad Smith, Next Generation Washington: Our Priorities for 2019, MICROSOFT
ON ISSUES (Feb. 11, 2019), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/02/11/
next-generation-washington-our-priorities-for-2019 [https://perma.cc/M3MR
-VZEM]; Wendy Davis, Microsoft Endorses Washington State Proposed Privacy Bill,
MEDIAPOST: DIGIT. NEWS DAILY (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.mediapost.com/
publications/article/331814/microsoft-endorses-washington-state-proposed-priva
.html [https://perma.cc/H36D-C7HJ].
339. Monica Nickelsburg, Washington State Considers New Privacy Law To Regulate
Data Collection and Facial Recognition Tech, GEEKWIRE (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www
.geekwire.com/2019/washington-state-considers-new-privacy-law-regulate-data
-collection-facial-recognition-tech [https://perma.cc/JRL5-6ZJZ] (paraphrasing Alben’s remarks).
340. Senate Passes Carlyle’s Washington Privacy Act, WASH. SENATE DEMOCRATS (Feb.
14, 2020), https://senatedemocrats.wa.gov/carlyle/2020/02/14/senate-passes
-carlyles-washington-privacy-act [https://perma.cc/TY6U-57MX].
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consumer advocacy organizations opposed the bill as too weak.341
Critics objected that the bill’s departure from elements of the GDPR,
especially in its enforcement mechanisms, would make it ineffective;
they also complained that industry lobbyists had too much influence
over a legislative process they considered opaque.342 After working to
mend fences with privacy advocates and expand industry support, the
bill’s sponsors reintroduced it in 2020, with most of the same core features, but again fell short at the end of the legislative session.343 Microsoft’s chief privacy officer, former FTC commissioner Julie Brill,344
has signaled that the company will continue to support legislation
modeled at least loosely on the GDPR, declaring, “We believe privacy
is a fundamental human right.”345
This story of the Washington Privacy Act displays the GDPR’s
Brussels Effect in action. But again, it also underscores the power of
individual or corporate norm entrepreneurs. A global company that
already complies with the GDPR has good reason to want to impose
costs on its competitors while publicly promoting stronger privacy
rights for its users and thus enhancing their trust in that company. In
addition, Brill, a former FTC commissioner who was well regarded
among privacy advocates, appears to be driving the agenda and bringing in compliance norms from a U.S. government agency.

341. Coalition Letter in Opposition to SB 5378, ACLU WASH. (Apr. 16, 2019), https://
www.aclu-wa.org/docs/coalition-letter-opposition-sb-5376 [https://perma.cc/
5UVT-8T23]; Washington State Privacy Bill Fails To Advance; Consumer Reports Says
Weak Bill Did Not Provide Meaningful Protections, CONSUMER REPS. ADVOC. (Apr. 18,
2019), https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/press_release/washington-state
-privacy-bill-fails-to-advance-consumer-reports-says-weak-bill-did-not-provide
-meaningful-protections [https://perma.cc/V6WS-AMH8]; see also Lucas Ropek, Why
Did Washington State’s Privacy Legislation Collapse?, GOV. TECH. (Apr. 19, 2019),
https://www.govtech.com/policy/Why-Did-Washington-States-Privacy-Legislation
-Collapse.html [https://perma.cc/L6RK-C67U].
342. Ropek, supra note 255.
343. Lucas Ropek, Washington Privacy Law Once Again Fails To Materialize, GOV.
TECH. (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.govtech.com/policy/Washington-Privacy-Law
-Once-Again-Fails-to-Materialize.html [https://perma.cc/JC9N-UC2G].
344. Former Commissioners, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/
biographies/former-commissioners [https://perma.cc/5F66-ZGDJ].
345. See Julie Brill, The New Washington Privacy Act Raises the Bar for Privacy in
the United States, MICROSOFT ON ISSUES (Jan. 24, 2020), https://blogs.microsoft.com/
on-the-issues/2020/01/24/washington-privacy-act-protection [https://perma.cc/
NA9L-VMAU]; Julie Brill, Our Support for Meaningful Privacy Protection Through the
Washington Privacy Act, MICROSOFT ON ISSUES (Apr. 29, 2019), https://blogs.microsoft
.com/on-the-issues/2019/04/29/our-support-for-meaningful-privacy-protection
-through-the-washington-privacy-act [https://perma.cc/3TWA-GHYD].
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Finally, the GDPR may be playing an important framing role in
policy discussions, acting to rhetorically normalize and ground current conversations around data privacy. The publicity accompanying
the advent of the GDPR may have stoked American public interest in
data privacy. The GDPR may be leading U.S. citizens—including the
North Dakota legislator mentioned above346—to wonder why EU persons get stronger privacy rights than Americans, and to question the
longstanding narrative that imposing digital privacy regulation will
break the Internet or otherwise kill innovation.347
Some may doubt the sincerity of California as a privacy regulator.
Data protection rules, critics will observe, encumber some of its leading corporations. They may assume that these corporations will hobble any real regulatory enforcement by the state. But California’s economy is far bigger than Silicon Valley alone. Of course, diffuse voices
fare poorly against actors with concentrated interests, as Mancur Olson observed.348 But Mary Stone Ross, Alastair MacTaggart, and others demonstrated that California’s initiative process could be leveraged to tap into a widely shared desire to protect privacy that could
overcome even concentrated industry opposition. Indeed, MacTaggart and his organization led the successful campaign to pass CCPA
revisions by ballot measure.349 This time, however, Mary Stone Ross
opposed the ballot measure, arguing that “the initiative would roll

346. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
347. For a description of the role of privacy law in the rise of U.S. Internet companies, see Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 642 (2014),
which states that “legal innovations in the 1990s that reduced liability concerns for
Internet intermediaries, coupled with low privacy protections, created a legal ecosystem that proved fertile for the new enterprises of what came to be known as Web 2.0.”
348. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS 2 (1965) (“[U]nless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or
unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their
common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests.”).
349. See Allison Grande, What’s at Stake as Calif. Privacy Law Revamp Goes to Voters, LAW360 (Oct. 23, 2020, 9:12 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1313938/
what-s-at-stake-as-calif-privacy-law-revamp-goes-to-voters [https://perma.cc/RBL8
-JNAK]; Sidney Fussell, One Clear Message from Voters This Election? More Privacy,
WIRED (Nov. 4, 2020, 8:26 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/one-clear-message
-voters-election-more-privacy [https://perma.cc/7N4A-RE3E].
For the full text of the California Privacy Rights and Enforcement Act of 2020, see
The California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, CAL. DEP’T JUST. (Nov. 4, 2020), https://oag
.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/19-0021A1%20%28Consumer%20Privacy%
20-%20Version%203%29_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/CWP9-C85F].
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back the CCPA’s protections and weaken core definitions of the law,
while making the biggest companies even more powerful.”350
Vogel argues that the California Effect requires that “nonstate actors in rich and powerful political jurisdictions prefer stronger regulatory standards.”351 Content-based industries based in Los Angeles
have long complained that Silicon Valley enterprises are insufficiently
attentive to intellectual property claims. The CCPA’s principal authors352 both represent districts bordering Los Angeles.353 Many Silicon Valley enterprises themselves support data privacy law, though
some suggest that the support is a strategic effort to undermine California’s privacy law with a weaker, preemptive federal law.354 There
is a reason for responsible Silicon Valley enterprises to embrace privacy law. Silicon Valley enterprises depend on users’ confidence that
revealing more and more of themselves to their electronic assistants
will not create privacy risks. Companies that violate that trust undermine trust for other companies as well.355 Ultimately, whether Californians or those outside the state trust the state’s privacy regulators will
depend on their performance.356
There are many more individual norm entrepreneurs at work
here in the spread of the CCPA to other states, and the federal response to it, than we have thus far allowed. As mentioned above, the
Uniform Law Commission’s new project to draft model state legislation represents one of the most formal such networks: commissioners
from every state consciously seek to replicate successful innovations
across state boundaries in a uniform way. Individual federal
350. Grande, supra note 349.
351. VOGEL, supra note 45, at 268.
352. Assemblymember Ed Chau and Senator Robert Hertzberg introduced the
CCPA. Issie Lapowsky, California Unanimously Passes Historic Privacy Bill, WIRED (June
28, 2018, 5:57 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/california-unanimously-passes
-historic-privacy-bill [https://perma.cc/LPW2-CW6B].
353. Chau represents the 49th Assembly District and Hertzberg represents the
18th Senate District. ED CHAU, https://a49.asmdc.org [https://perma.cc/NBG3-GUY9];
SENATOR ROBERT HERTZBERG, https://sd18.senate.ca.gov [https://perma.cc/Q4SK
-9DYQ].
354. Russell Brandom, Tim Cook Wants a Federal Privacy Law—but So Do Facebook
and Google, VERGE (Oct. 24, 2018, 4:12 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/24/
18018686/tim-cook-apple-privacy-law-facebook-google-gdpr [https://perma.cc/
QDP5-3NH5].
355. See Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Sharing Personal Information in a Networked World, 69 U. MIA. L. REV. 559, 598 (2015); see also Balkin, supra note 137; Richards & Hartzog, supra note 284, at 435.
356. Cf. Ann E. Carlson, Regulatory Capacity and State Environmental Leadership: California’s Climate Policy, 24 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 63, 65–66 (2012) (describing
success of California’s environmental policy agency).
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representatives are catalysts for change. Senator Wyden, for example,
has been a privacy advocate for years and may be taking advantage of
current dynamics to push for changes to federal law.357 Civil society
groups such as the Center for Democracy and Technology have proposed discussion legislation in hopes of influencing the federal debate.358 The North Dakota legislator who watched a GDPR documentary, too, can be characterized as a norm entrepreneur. David Hoffman
at Intel Corporation, characterized as a longtime “industry leader on
privacy,” developed a draft federal proposal that Intel released for
comments.359 These stories likely represent the tip of a very large iceberg of individuals and knowledge networks working to harness existing forces to propagate new law.
This suggests the early growth of what we call “catalysis networks.” Paul Schwartz has noted the existence of “harmonization networks” (a term coined by Anne-Marie Slaughter) in privacy law—networks of “regulators in different countries [who] work together to
harmonize or otherwise adjust different kinds of domestic law.”360
What we are seeing here is not solely attempts by various actors to
harmonize U.S. and EU law on the ground (although it is certainly in
the interest of global companies to minimize disparities). We predict
that we are seeing the emergence of both individuals and networks
taking advantage of the moment to drive both broader geographic
coverage and perhaps new forms of law.
In one version of this story, the CCPA becomes not just a catalyst
but a floor of protection nationwide. There are certainly plenty of reasons to believe this might be the case. That said, we turn now to several potential limits on Californian catalysis.
D. CONSTRAINTS ON CALIFORNIAN CATALYSIS
There are at least three possible constraints on the nationwide
spread of CCPA-like privacy law. First, the complex relationship between state and federal sovereignty in the U.S. constitutional order interacts substantially with the ability of state laws like the CCPA to operate or spread nationally. Both the dormant commerce clause and
357. See Sara Morrison, The Year We Gave Up on Privacy, VOX (Dec. 23, 2020, 8:00
AM), https://www.vox.com/recode/22189727/2020-pandemic-ruined-digital
-privacy; Kerry, supra note 266.
358. CDT’s Privacy Legislation, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., https://cdt.org/
campaign/federal-privacy-legislation [https://perma.cc/4AZG-K8EF].
359. Kerry, supra note 266.
360. Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1967 (2013).
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potential federal preemption of state law could limit the reach of state
law and the catalytic effect of the CCPA.361 Second, while it is beyond
the scope of this Article to address these arguments at length, recent
First Amendment doctrine may create problems for the CCPA and similar laws.362 Finally, we note the possibility that new models, notably
including “trust” or “fiduciary” concepts, may take root and out-race
both the GDPR and the CCPA to become the dominant catalyst for new
privacy law.
1. The Dormant Commerce Clause
Because Internet regulation inevitably spills over jurisdictional
lines, the dormant commerce clause plays an important role in disciplining any individual state’s Internet regulation. As the Supreme
Court has explained, “By prohibiting States from discriminating
against or imposing excessive burdens on interstate commerce without congressional approval, [the dormant commerce clause] strikes at
one of the chief evils that led to the adoption of the Constitution,
namely, state tariffs and other laws that burdened interstate commerce.”363
The dormant commerce clause imposes two separate conditions
on regulatory spillovers: (1) the regulation at issue must not discriminate against interstate commerce,364 and (2) it must not impose excessive burdens on interstate commerce.365 The Supreme Court has
offered a general principle: “Where [a] statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits.”366

361. One of the authors of this Article has spoken to attorneys who are already
planning to challenge the CCPA under the dormant commerce clause.
362. For an account of the ways that the First Amendment has limited U.S. privacy
law, see Chander & Lê, supra note 137, at 516–22.
363. Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 (2015).
364. Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (“Under the . . . protocol
for dormant Commerce Clause analysis, we ask whether a challenged law discriminates against interstate commerce.”).
365. Id. (“A discriminatory law is virtually per se invalid, and will survive only if it
advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
366. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). A finding that a statute is
discriminatory could “be overcome by a showing that the State has no other means to
advance a legitimate local purpose.” United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid
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Early cases challenging state Internet regulation on commerce
clause grounds met with some success. Among the first was a 1997
decision in American Library Ass’n v. Pataki, overturning a New York
statute that prohibited the transmission of obscene content to minors.367 Into the early twenty-first century, a number of courts followed the lead of Pataki when evaluating similar statutes.368 However,
courts in other contexts have departed from Pataki’s approach, upholding, for example, state anti-spam statutes against commerce
clause challenges.369 A California appeals court “reject[ed] Pataki’s
holding that any State regulation of Internet use violates the dormant
commerce clause.”370
A federal district court case from California seems particularly
relevant. That case considered a dormant commerce clause challenge
to an earlier California privacy law. In 2014, two Californians filed a
class action against Omni Hotels, alleging a violation of the California
Invasion of Privacy Act, a 1967 statute that makes it illegal to record a
conversation without consent of both parties. Omni Hotels had set up
its call center in Nebraska and complied fully with Nebraska law. Nebraska offered “an employer friendly law that exempts business from
state wiretap statutes and gives employers the right to intercept, disclose and use e-mails in the ordinary course of business.”371 Omni argued that practically speaking, to comply with California law, it would
have to notify all callers to its customer service about the recording,
not just Californians, and that this constituted a per se violation of the
commerce clause.372
Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007) (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138
(1986)).
367. Am. Librs. Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[T]he Internet is one of those areas of commerce that must be marked off as a national preserve
to protect users from inconsistent legislation that, taken to its most extreme, could
paralyze development of the Internet altogether.”). For a critique of this decision, see
Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110
YALE L.J. 785, 786–87 (2001).
368. See ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1161 (10th Cir. 1999); PSINet, Inc. v.
Chapman, 362 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2004); Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96,
104 (2d Cir. 2003); Se. Booksellers Ass’n v. McMaster, 282 F. Supp. 2d 389, 396 (D.S.C.
2003); Cyberspace Commc’ns, Inc. v. Engler, 142 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831 (E.D. Mich.
2001).
369. Washington v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 413 (Wash. 2001); Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 268–69 (Ct. App. 2002).
370. Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265.
371. Ades v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 46 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1009–10 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
(citation omitted).
372. Id. at 1012 (“Omni asserts that because the portability of mobile phone numbers makes it unfeasible to distinguish between Californian and non-Californian calls,
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The court decided that the California law did not discriminate
against out-of-state providers and went on to consider whether the
statute unduly burdened interstate commerce.373 It concluded, “Overall, the Court finds that the interests of California in the privacy of its
consumers would be affected more by the application of Nebraska law
than Nebraska’s pro-business interests would be affected by the application of California law.”374 If Omni had prevailed, then Nebraska
would have, wittingly or not, created the ideal conditions for a privacy
race to the bottom: locate your call center in Nebraska and ignore privacy laws in the other jurisdictions where your callers reside. The district court’s ruling avoided that result.
The CCPA does not appear to facially discriminate against interstate commerce.375 The statute is written broadly to cover all businesses that deal with the private information of California residents,
regardless of where they are located. As long as the California attorney
general does not enforce the law against foreign companies in a discriminatory fashion, the CCPA would likely survive at least this prong
of the doctrine.
The more realistic potential basis for a challenge would be the
contention that the CCPA poses an “excessive burden” on interstate
commerce. While it is possible that enforcement of the CCPA would
occur in a manner that leads to such an excessive burden, a federal
court may well conclude that the important interests at stake justified
the CCPA’s reasonable interventions across state lines. While businesses will complain of heightened compliance costs (as Omni complained of the California recording law), California’s interests in protecting its residents’ privacy may well justify those additional costs (as
the court concluded in the Omni litigation).376 However, uncertainty
may yet deter other states from following the CCPA’s lead, at least until any commerce clause challenge is resolved.

compliance with § 632.7 would force Omni to warn all callers, even those from singleconsent states, that they could be recorded.”).
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. As the Supreme Court has explained this aspect of dormant commerce clause
doctrine, “‘discrimination’ simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-ofstate economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.” United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338–39 (2007)
(quoting Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).
376. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 46 F. Supp. 3d at 1015.
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2. Preemption
The CCPA could face another federalism-based challenge to its
catalytic effect on other states, coming not from the courts but from
Congress. State laws may be preempted when compliance with both
state and federal mandates is impossible, and thus the introduction of
a comprehensive federal privacy law could lead to preemption of part
or all of the CCPA.377 In many domains, Congress has adopted federal
statutes that explicitly preempt state law in the same area, thus establishing uniform national standards on a topic.378 A new federal statute
with an express preemption clause would unravel the CCPA and any
potential imitators at the state level. The sudden support of many industry groups for federal privacy law is likely motivated by the desire
for just this outcome.379
Who should regulate privacy in the United States? Should states
regulate privacy, should the federal government, or should both?
There are thoughtful arguments for federal preemption of stricter
state regulation, but we conclude that, on balance, the federal government should establish a national minimum, not a national maximum,
for data privacy. This is what William Buzbee has called “floor
preemption,” allowing a one-way ratchet for standards—upwards—
across the United States.380 In fact, preemption may be the issue that
kills proposed federal data privacy law, as powerful Californians and
Democrats line up against the industry and Republicans. House
Speaker Nancy Pelosi has vowed not to support any federal privacy
law that provides fewer protections than the CCPA or indeed that
preempts state law at all.381 However, industry will be less interested
in any federal law if it would not supersede the CCPA.
377. See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963).
378. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 301 (federal preemption provision of the Copyright Act of
1976); 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (preempting state law concerning food labeling); 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144 (federal preemption provision of ERISA). See generally S. Candice Hoke,
Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 700 (1991).
379. Writing of this dynamic in other contexts, Roderick Hills Jr. explains this apparent contradiction: “[F]ederal regulation frequently results from lobbying efforts by
industry interests that oppose regulation. The apparent paradox of this statement dissolves when one takes into account industry’s desire for uniformity of regulation.” Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 20 (2007).
380. We borrow here the federal regulation framework set out by William Buzbee.
William Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1549 (2007).
381. Darius Tahir, Pelosi Puts Privacy Marker Down, POLITICO (Apr. 15, 2019,
10:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-ehealth/2019/04/15/
pelosi-puts-privacy-marker-down-424986 [https://perma.cc/GJ39-7J9J] (“‘We
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There are virtues of a single national standard.382 A national privacy law would establish uniformity across the region—rather than
promising higher or lower protections depending on where a person
is or where their data is processed or held.383 It would facilitate data
flows across state borders without requiring legal review of the laws
of multiple jurisdictions. It would avoid the possibility of inconsistent
mandates such as inconsistent notice requirements. Compliance costs
likely would go down with only one legal standard.
But a federal preemption ceiling raises substantial concerns. It
risks establishing a minimal level of privacy—one lower than that a
state such as California could have demanded. Second, it may reduce
existing enforcement capacity and expertise by sidelining state attorneys general who currently engage in significant enforcement of data
privacy and data security law.384 States have a long history of regulating privacy, much of it developed through the common law.385 As Peter Swire has documented, existing federal privacy legislation generally serves as a regulatory floor, not a ceiling, including sector-specific
preemption provisions adopted since the mid-1990s.386 This reflects
what Buzbee observes, that “[i]n most areas focused on regulation of
risks . . . such as discrimination and efforts to enhance public welfare
through regulation of environmental, occupational, and product risks,
the protective ‘one way ratchet’ of floor preemption . . . has been the

cannot accept anything—for example, the Republicans would want preemption of
state law. Well, that’s just not going to happen,’ [Pelosi] said. ‘We in California are not
going to say, “You pass a law that weakens what we did in California.” That won’t happen.’”).
382. See Schwartz, supra note 76, at 423–27; Patricia L. Bellia, Federalization in Information Privacy Law, 118 YALE L.J. 868, 890–99 (2009).
383. Bellia, supra note 382, at 897.
384. Citron, supra note 87, at 798–99 (observing important role of states in privacy
protection). To avoid this problem, any federal preemption could expressly retain an
enforcement role for state attorneys general. See Peter Swire, US Federal Privacy
Preemption Part 2: Examining Preemption Proposals, IAPP (Jan. 10, 2019), https://iapp
.org/news/a/us-federal-privacy-preemption-part-2-examining-preemption
-proposals [https://perma.cc/KQS5-KUV4].
385. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 386–87 (1960).
386. Peter Swire, US Federal Privacy Preemption Part 1: History of Federal Preemption of Stricter State Laws, IAPP (Jan. 9, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/us-federal
-privacy-preemption-part-1-history-of-federal-preemption-of-stricter-state-laws
[https://perma.cc/R3WR-KF8C]. Both HIPAA and GINA serve as floors for state regulation, not ceilings. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.203–.205 (2019) (HIPAA); Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 2(5), 122 Stat. 881, 882–83.
While the Fair Credit Reporting Act preempts some causes of action, it permits states
to regulate identity theft. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(a).
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legislative and regulatory norm.”387 Most importantly, a federal
preemption ceiling risks losing the regulatory innovation that continued state legislation in the area might supply.388
New federal privacy law could provide a nationwide floor, permitting states to intervene only to the extent that they raise privacy
standards further. This allows for state innovations and experimentation. Writing of an earlier narrow California law that permits minors
to delete certain information they uploaded to Internet sites, Heather
Gerken and James Dawson argue that “[i]f the experiment proves
workable, California’s ‘eraser’ law may serve as a model for future regulation; if the experiment fails, policy-makers will be all the wiser.”389
Of course, a national floor sacrifices the uniformity of a single national
standard, increasing compliance costs. But if any state offers a toostrict privacy rule—one that is too difficult to comply with given its
business model—a corporation might simply refuse to provide it the
relevant product or service.
Yet an additional option, raised previously by Paul Schwartz,
might be a Clean Air Act model for data privacy: Congress could designate California as a kind of superregulator, granting it the exclusive
right to deviate upwards from the federal privacy standard.390 This
would allow California alone the opportunity to innovate in the area
and permit other states to choose either California’s or the federal
government’s rules. It would lower regulatory compliance costs but
preserve some room for upward regulation. However, it would forego
the possibility of experimentation in other states, which might regulate differently, more clearly, or more stringently than California.391
For example, this approach could destroy the prospect of a new “trust”
model emerging from legislation such as the bill proposed in New
York.392
Regulating in the face of substantial uncertainty will require a dynamic approach. Because of the pace of change in data gathering and
processing, information privacy is a study in surprising turns. Data
can be used in unexpected ways; its benefits and drawbacks are yet to
387. Buzbee, supra note 380, at 1552.
388. See Schwartz, supra note 76, at 917 (describing states as “laboratories for innovations in information privacy law”).
389. Heather K. Gerken & James T. Dawson, Living Under Someone Else’s Law, 36
DEMOCRACY J. 42, 47 (2015).
390. Schwartz, supra note 76, at 935 (referencing Ann Carlson’s scholarship).
391. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453 (2017); 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17 (2009); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 646A.600–.628 (2007).
392. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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be fully discovered. The last handful of years have brought us tracking
pixels, facial recognition, deep fakes, robot dogs, and even omnipresent satellites.393 If a federal bill ossifies the rules, we may not be able
to generate the regulations needed for yet more surprising turns. Of
course, the federal government is capable of more agile versions of
governance such as collaborative governance or responsive regulation, including through a regulatory agency like the FTC.394
If a federal law preempts state information privacy law, the CCPA
might be lost to history, a mere footnote in the centuries of evolution
of privacy law. Yet we believe it would still have served a critical role:
prompting an omnibus federal privacy law for the first time since the
dawn of the Internet age. As Gerken and Dawson observe, “By creating
a spillover, a single innovative state can put an item on the national
agenda even if nearly everyone else—Congress, interest groups, and
other states—would prefer that the issue go away.”395 This would be
a significant and long-lasting California Effect, indeed.
3. The First Amendment
Another potential constraint on the enactment of state and federal laws, and indeed the survival of the CCPA, is the First Amendment.
Discussed above in the context of the differing regulatory settings of
the European Union and United States, the First Amendment potentially poses constraints on drafters of U.S. privacy law. While in-depth
coverage of these constraints—and their limitations—is outside of
this Article’s scope, we outline a few basic concepts here.

393. Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya & Jonathan Frankle, The Perpetual Line-Up: Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America, GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIV. & TECH. (Oct. 18,
2016), https://www.perpetuallineup.org [https://perma.cc/RB45-VME5]; Ry Crist,
Yes, the Robot Dog Ate Your Privacy, CNET (June 28, 2019, 8:21 AM), https://www.cnet
.com/news/yes-the-robot-dog-ate-your-privacy [https://perma.cc/ZZT8-W3CK];
Christopher Beam, Soon, Satellites Will Be Able To Watch You Everywhere All the Time,
TECH. REV. (June 26, 2019, 8:21 AM), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/613748/
satellites-threaten-privacy [https://perma.cc/2BAY-PCNT].
394. Charles Sabel and his coauthors argue for the virtue of a “rolling-rule regime”
where “regulators use reports on proposals and outcomes to periodically reformulate
minimum performance standards, desirable targets, and paths for moving from the
former to the latter.” Charles Sabel, Archon Fung & Bradley Karkkainen, Beyond Backyard Environmentalism, 24 BOS. REV. 4, 4 (1999). For other agile governance models,
see Dennis D. Hirsch, Going Dutch? Collaborative Dutch Privacy Regulation and the Lessons It Holds for U.S. Privacy Law, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 83, 151–60; McGeveran, supra
note 20, at 979–85; and Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 83 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1309, 1330–35 (2015).
395. Gerken & Dawson, supra note 389, at 46.
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The First Amendment protects freedom of speech. It also protects
expressive activity (speech mixed with action) and penumbral activity
necessary for speech to take place (such as the placement of newspaper kiosks to distribute newspapers or the purchase of pen and paper).396 A series of First Amendment cases on public records established significant limitations on laws restricting the distribution of
lawfully obtained information.397 More recently, the Supreme Court
applied the First Amendment to find unconstitutional a Vermont law
regulating the sale of prescription drug user data.398 And in 2018, the
Supreme Court found unconstitutional a series of disclosure requirements aimed at protecting patients from pro-life organizations posing
as abortion providers in a decision that could have consequences for
other disclosure-based consumer protection regimes.399
Recently, the expansive coverage and protection of First Amendment doctrine has led some to decry its potential deregulatory effects.400 On the other hand, privacy scholars have noted that the First
Amendment also provides arguments for effective privacy law, as a
lack of privacy can chill free expression.401 Commentators disagree on
396. See Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right To Record, 97 B.U. L. REV. 167,
189 (2017).
397. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 493–95 (1975); see also Volokh, supra
note 137, at 1116–17.
398. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011); see Chander, supra note 137
(arguing that Sorrell demonstrates “the seriousness of First Amendment constraints
on privacy regulations on information intermediaries”). Cases such as Florida Star v.
B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), Cox Broadcasting Corp., 420 U.S. 469, and Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing, 443 U.S. 97 (1979), can be read to stand for the principle that once information is legally distributed, government cannot restrict its use absent state interest
of the highest order. However, a number of scholars argue that privacy laws can pass
First Amendment muster. Balkin, supra note 137, at 1189. But see Volokh, supra note
137, at 1051.
399. See Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: Divided Court Rules for Anti-Abortion Pregnancy Centers in Challenge to California Law, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2018, 4:02 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/opinion-analysis-divided-court-rules-for
-anti-abortion-pregnancy-centers-in-challenge-to-california-law [https://perma.cc/
Q7WJ-VFZB].
400. See Shanor, supra note 185, at 133; MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE
CONSTITUTION 105 (2019).
401. See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, Constitutional Safeguards for Silent Experiments
in Living: Libraries, the Right To Read, and a First Amendment Theory for an Unaccompanied Right To Receive Information, 74 UMKC L. REV. 799, 800 (2006); Julie E. Cohen,
A Right To Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” in Cyberspace,
28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1003–19 (1996); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L.
REV. 387, 393–94 (2008); Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect:
First Amendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV.
465, 467 (2015); Skinner-Thompson, supra note 185; Anupam Chander, Youthful
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how much of data privacy law might survive First Amendment challenges.402 Through court challenges or through its expanding cultural
penumbra, the First Amendment may chill the spread of the CCPA.
CONCLUSION
What does all of this mean for our privacy? The end result of the
race between the GDPR and the CCPA may well be a hybrid of both.
The de facto privacy law governing global corporations may be the
strictest aspects of both California and European law—a figurative,
but not literal, highest common denominator.403 Thanks to a Brussels
Effect, some large global enterprises would adhere to GDPR norms.
But thanks to a California Effect in one of the various forms we have
described, that state would have outsized influence on the substance
of U.S. privacy law—as Alastair Mactaggart has boasted, “Under [the
CCPA], the attorney general of California will become the chief privacy
officer of the United States of America.”404 Many corporations will find
themselves comporting with both regimes simultaneously, rather
than configuring their services or offerings by jurisdiction. Call this
hybrid the “CDPR”—the CCPA + the GDPR.
But this de facto reality only goes so far. Those outside either jurisdiction will not be able to assert those rights directly with either
regulators or courts. Both regimes grant individual rights only to their
own residents. For example, the much-embattled facial recognition
company Clearview provides only Californians and European Union
residents the opportunity to opt out.405
We predict that within the United States, the CCPA will yet continue to drive both businesses and legislatures. The CCPA, both de
facto and de jure, will likely call the tune for the march of a new American data privacy spreading to other jurisdictions. California, not Brussels, has emerged as the superregulator of U.S. privacy law.

Indiscretion in an Internet Age, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET 124, 134 (Saul Levmore &
Martha Nussbaum eds., 2010).
402. For a sampling of this extensive debate, see Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?,
66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 60–61 (2014); Richards, supra note 137, at 1521–22; and Volokh,
supra note 137, at 1050–51.
403. A more mathematical analogy might be two curves mapping out various issues on the x axis with y being the level of strictness for each issue, resulting in a third
operational curve consisting of the highest peaks between the two curves.
404. Confessore, supra note 295.
405. Privacy Request Forms, CLEARVIEW.AI, https://clearview.ai/privacy/requests
[https://perma.cc/BU9L-8MG7] (including a separate reference to the UK necessitated by Brexit).

